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PREFACE
This paper is a preliminary investigation of the "Christian
Ethics" of Dietrich Bonhoeffer in terms of its self-consistency
and sufficiency for moral guidance.

As Christian, Bonhoefferts

ethic serves as a concrete instance of the ways in which religious dogmas are both regulative and formative of human behavioro
Accordingly, this paper will study (a) the internal consistency
of the revealed data and structural principles within Bonhoefferts system, and (b) the significance of biblical directives for
moral decisionso

The question of Bonhoefferfs "success," then,

presents a double problem.

First, one needs to test the intrin-

sic clarity of Bonhoeffer's relationship of the supernatural and
natural orders o

Secondly, one needs to consider the adequacy of

his Christian ethics in terms of man's moral needs.
In evaluating the ethical system of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, it
is necessary to realize the incomplete and fragmentary character
of many of his writings.

Also to be noted is the absence of a

definitive biography of his life.

The estimation of Bonhoeffer's

moral theory is complicated further by his many letters, notes
and lectures.

While the latter demonstrate the range and insight

of his mind, their lack of systematic treatment makes it difficult to get any confident grasp of the author's meaning.
ii

There is evidence of an ethical concern throughout all of
Bonhoeffer's writings.

However, Bonhoeffer attempted only one

major work in the field of ethics, and this systematic effort was
interrupted by his imprisonment in 1943.

Nonetheless, this work

was edited and published in 1949 in spite of its incomplete
stage.

Entitled Ethics, it must be interpreted in light of the

complete corpus of Bonhoeffer's writings, as well as of that
information about the author which can be derived from his famil
and associates.

In this manner, one can hope to comprehend Bon-

hoaffer's most mature statement on the character of Christian
ethics.
For easy reference, all quotations are taken from the
English editions of Bonhoeffer's works.

These translations are

more accessible than the German compendium (Gesammelte Schriften,
Vol. I-IV, Eberhard Bethge, ed., Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag,
1958-1961)0
I am grateful to Father Edward Maziarz, C.P.P.S., both for
his advice and critical comments which have directed this thesis
to its final form.

Many problems of content and style were

avoided by his careful judgment

0

My thanks also go to Mrs.

George Connelly who proofread and typed the final draft.

It goes

without saying that they are not responsible for any defects that
might remain.

iii
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INTRODUCTION
An

enduring problem in the history of philosophy concerns

the relationship between faith and reason.

Different theological

premises can cause different viewpoints about ontology, anthropology and ethics.

Ethical systems usually vary according to the

theological positions which they implicitly or explicitly hold.
Any information concerning the nature of man gained from Revelation is therefore relevant for conceiving of man's specific
happiness and the human activities necessary to its achievement.
When Christianity serves as the context of the ethical discussion, the Fall of Man and the Incarnation are two pivotal
doctrines that largely determine the place of reason in the formulation of ideal behavior.

The effects of the primordial sin

condition the capacities and limitations of human nature.

Again,

the reality of the Incarnation affects human destiny, and it is
possible, therefore, that the Redemption is operative in one's
definition of human nature.

For example, the traditional Catho-

lic doctrine on the results of Original Sin states that man's
essential mode of being was merely modified.

This dogma is con-

trary to the orthodox Calvinist view that man's nature was
changed radically.

Subsequently, because of various sectarian

interpretations of scripture, a different status and validity
1

2

is granted to rational and natural norms.

Revelation is influen-

tial in one's ethics not only because the Bible contains moral
directives but also because it is pertinent to the origins,
nature and destiny of man.
This paper assumes that morality is a problem of rational
deliberation as well as of religious beliefs.

The freedom of man

to choose between possible modes of behavior and a sense of right
and wrong to guide such choices are prerequisites for an "ethical" system.

If these assumptions are not granted by the theolo-

gian, then morality becomes simply a matter of biblical exegesiso

A proper coordination of moral theology and moral philosophy
seems necessary for the concrete direction of one's life.

There-

fore, theology and philosophy must remain open to mutual criticism.

Philosophy can clarify the notions of faith, illuminate

the implications of revealed truth and provide theologians with
a criterion for a viable terminologyo

However, it can perform

this function only in partnership with faith.

If the theological

elements of some moral theory are so privileged as to exclude
rational analysis, then perhaps that theory is also beyond clarification and development.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer was a Lutheran theologian; his career
was motivated by the attempt to expound the doctrines of Martin
Luther.
concerns.

His work called Ethics was inspired by such theological
The book is admirable as a logical and concrete appli-

cation of the Lutheran dogmas of Sin and Reconciliation to the
roblems of 20th centur

moral it •

The current

of

3

Bonhoeffer testifies to the honesty and insight of his analysis
of the complexities of ethical decision, the nature of

conscienc~

the social effects of ethical criteria and previous ethical
theories.

However, Ethics claims to be more than a theory of

_oral theology; the author states that it is a critique of all
ethical systems.

"Christian EthiCS," in Bonhoeffer's opinion,

invalidates all knowledge of good and evil. l

He claims to have

evidence about human nature that is not available to philosophical investigation and, moreover, which renders rational study
useless.
The validity of a philosophical analysis of Bonhoeffer's
Christian ethic rests on the assumption that reason as well as
faith is

n~cessary

for the proper orientation of life.

Further-

.ore, Bonhoeffer's denial of a philosophical dimension in ethical
considerations seems to lead to incongruities.

In the first

place, Bonhoeffer's rejection of any philosophical approach to
~orality

is itself a philosophical position and therefore open to

rational rebuttal.

Secondly, Bonhoeffer consciously utilizes

Whilosophical (Kantian) argumentation to prove the bankruptcy
of natural morality.
~istorical

As a result, it follows that Bonhoeffer's

accuracy and epistemology are questionable.

the meaning of Bonhoeffer's terminology is difficult.

Thirdly,
For in-

stance, what is the significance of the term "ethical lt in Bon~oefferfs

system, since he considers unaided human nature inea-

lDietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, ed. Eberhard Bathge (New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1955), p. 17.

4

pable of choosing the right course of action?

Fourthly, his

theology is admittedly Lutheran and surely not the only inter~retation

theology.

of revelation that might be of consequence in moral
All of these reasons for applying philosophical cri-

teria to the ethics of Bonhoeffer are reducible to a basic presupposition that faith and reason are interdependent in evaluating the quality of onets life.
The main purpose of this thesis is to correctly understand
Bonhoefferfs moral theory and recognize the originality and sensitivity of his ethical proposals.
objective of this investigation.

Criticism is not the prime
The chapters of this study will

attempt, first, to determine the place of ethics within the context of Bonhoeffer's life and thought (Chapter I).

Then, Bon-

hoefferts definition of theology and philosophy and his notion
of human existence will be discussed as the foundations of his
ethical system (Chapter II).

This paper will then turn to an

examination and critique of Bonhoefferfs theory of a viable
Christian ethic (Chapters III and IV).

Only if these areas are

researched properly can an integral perspective of Bonhoeffer's
motives and achievements in the area of ethics be obtained.

CHAPTER I
THE PLACE OF ETHICS IN DIETRICH BONHOEFFER'S
LIFE AND THEOLOGY
Dietrich Bonhoeffer was a theologian whose life spanned the
era of the two World Wars.

His dialectical theology was an ef-

fort to bring the gospel down to earth and place it at the centez
of life.

He interpreted the Christian message for a generation

that felt the rise of Adolf Hitler and experienced the crises
that National Socialism presented to Western Civilization.

His

writings and activitiesmade him a spokesman of the Confessing
Church of Germany, the center of theological resistance to Hitler.
while his convictions also demanded his active participation in
the political resistance.

Bonhoefferts ecclesiastical position

and historical awareness revealed the implications and consequences of Nazism with such clarity that he envisioned a new
to render Christian attitudes operative.

moralit~

The attempt to formu-

late and live a modern ethic led to Bonhoeffer's execution in the
Flossenberg Prison on the 9th of April, 1945.
It

~as

Bonhoeffer's historical situation and the concrete

nature of his theology that caused him to turn to the matter of
ethicso

Bonhoeffer's ethical approach was historically condi-

tioned by the German post-war reconstruction and the pressures
of Nazi opposition.

The twentieth century revealed forces that

5
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exceeded the restraints of nineteenth century morality.

The

Third Reich created questions for which previous ethics had no
answers.

It is understandable that the theologian intent upon

defining the mode of being of a Christian would feel it necessa
to conceptualize that behavior proper to the contemporary believer.

Bonhoeffer's final work--his Ethics--was an attempt to

establish morals in a manner consistent with the circumstances
of his time and adequate to its ethical needs.

Indeed, Ethics

as his final word and martyrdom as his final act are correlatives
and indicate that the context for understanding Bonhoeffer's
oral theory is the dialectic of his theology and his life.
~o

follow the evolution of Bonhoeffer's ethical theory, it

is necessary to accept the fact that he was first and foremost
a theologian.

Moreover, it is obvious that his theology shows

stages of change consistent with his professional activities.
Three general periods are evident in Bonhoeffer's life; these
stages further serve to categorize his theological achievement.
The first period, from his birth in 1906 to his acceptance of a
London pastorate in 1933, covers his academic career.

In the

eriod from 1933 to approximately 1940, Bonhoeffer's activity
oentered around the ecumenical movement and the struggle within
Germany between the Confessing Church, which opposed Hitler, and
the State Church, which supported Hitler.

The third and final

stage of Bonhoeffer's life, from 1940 to 1945, concerned his
involvement in the political resistance to Hitler and his lengthy
imprisonment.

7
There is debate as to which theological concern is dominant
during each of these periods,l but general agreement as to the
evidence of three stages.

This consensus indicates the close

relationship that exists between Bonhoefferts empirical situation
and his theology.

These three periods also show the influences

operative in the ethical stance of Bonhoeffer.

Therefore, these

stages will constitute the order of this investigation.
~

and University, 1906-1933

The formative period of Bonhoeffer's life stretches from
his birth in Breslau in 1906 to his exodus from the University of
Berlin in October, 1933.

The dual factors of home and university

oondition the facets of Bonhoeffer's thought, and influence the
later stages of his theology, ,systematic and moral.

The concern

for ethics is not pervasive during these years, yet certain precedents and directives are evident.
Of the formative elements in Bonhoeffer's life and thought
it is necessary to seriously consider his home.

Indeed, Eber-

hard Bethge, Dietrich's close friend and official biographer,
advises that "Bonhoeffer's life could be understood in terms of
the Bonhoeffer family.

The traits of his character, his decision

IJohn D. Godsy says that the theme of Christology is the key
to Bonhoeffer's thought. The TheOlO~y of Dietrich Bonhoeffer
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 19 0), pp. 265-66. Eberhard
~ethge's opinion is that the "concretion of revelation ff is Bonnoeffer's unifying concept. "The Challenge of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Life and Thought,1t The Chicago Theological Seminary Register, LI (February, 1961), p. 3.

8

to take up the study of theology, even his martyrdom--all have
their sources in the family.u 2

The home was upper-middle class,

scientifically orientated and secular minded.

It was strongly

conditioned by the personality of Dietrich's father.
Karl Bonhoeffer was a doctor who accepted a chair in Neurology and Psychiatry at the University of Berlin in 1912.
demanding father, but not domineering.

He was a

He raised his eight chil-

dren in a thoroughly academic atmosphere and instilled in them an
appreciation of leisure and culture.

He was aloof and reserved,

demanding that even his children demonstrate only adult qualities.

However, punishment was never phYSical or coercive;

rather, it was simply done with such mannerisms as an ironical
smile or a raise in the eyebrows. 3

Karl Bonhoeffer reared his

children as Lutherans, but his scientific bent of mind reduced
the religious mood of the family to a humanism of responsible
action and concern for others.
Dietrich's mother, Paula, came from a long line of distinguished ecclesiastics, her grandfather being Carl von Hase, a
noted church historian of the nineteenth century.

She gave Die-

trich his physical appearance, exuberant spirit and feeling for
music.

Her grief at the war death of her second son, Walter,

2Ved Metha, The New Theologian (New York: Harper and Row,
1965), p. 146. Mitlia'TfSchapter on "Pastor Bonhoeffer" is the result of interviews with personal friends and profeSSional associates of Bonhoeffer.

3This appraisal is given by Sabine Leibholz, Dietrich's
twin Sister, in her article "Childhood and Home lf in I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer (New York: 1966), po 21.
- ---- ---

9
may have pre-disposed Dietrich to take a pacifistio position in
the Second World War. 4

At any rate, her warmth offset the cool

self-oontrol of her husband and made the home a life-long influence on the unmarried Dietrich.
The careers of the Bonhoeffer children were in tune with
either the scientific concerns of the father or the ministerial
precedents in their lineage.

Karl Friedrich, the eldest, was a

biochemist; Walter was studying to be a zoologist before his
death at the front; Klaus was an adventurer and traveled extensively.

These three eldest children were intellectual and agnos-

tic; their interests concerned soientific subjects.

They rein-

forced the secular temperament of the Bonhoeffer household.
From temperament and reaotion to the successes of his older
~rothers,

years old.

Dietrich decided to study theology when he was fourteen
Dietrich, with Sabine and Suzanne, comprised the

"little ones" of the family.

He realized that he had slight

chance of distinguishing himself in an area previously entered
by another brother.

Karl Friedrich was considered the most in-

telligent of the children while Walter was the most heroic in
the eyes of the parents. 5

Dietrich, therefore, chose the study

of Hebrew during his last tWG years at the GymnaSium.

He thereby

displayed a commitment to the ministry even though it was distasteful to the family.

4 Metha, p. 148.
5Ibido, pp. 149-50.

"The Bonhoeffer's were not a

church-go~

10

family and all the family baptisms, weddings and funerals were
performed in the house by an uncle, who was a pastor, and even
so, was the victim of a certain amount of derision. tt6

However,

Dietrich's competitive spirit? needed a field to call his own,
and at seventeen he began taking theology courses at the University of !ubingeno
Only a fragmented pioture oan be drawn of Bonhoefferts home
life.

However, it had a formative importanoe in his ethics.

A

search for the element of continuity in Bonhoeffer's thought, for
the source of the theme of "worldly Christianity," of an "ethics
of responsibility," or for the empirical flavor of his final
period, has certain origins within the Bonhoeffer homeo

Refer-

ence must now be made to the extra-familial and academic forces
that impressed Bonhoeffer's first period, simply because of the
lack of an authoritative biography.8

Enough has been said, how-

ever, to predict a certain regard for the concrete in his moral
theology, and a predominant interest in the ethical decisions
6Ibid ., p. 1510
?The need to excel within Bonhoeffer is often mentioned by
those who knew him. Emmi Bonhoeffer, Klaus' wife, mentions his
will to win at sports when a child. I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer,
p. 35. At Union Theological Seminary~ ~oid Paul Lehmann he
would not play tennis with anyone who was not proficient at the
game. Ibid., p. 43. He told Wolf-Dieter Zimmermann that he
wished to die young so that he would not have to know the decline
of his abilities. Matha,~. 2!!., p. 143.
8Bonhoeffer's close friend, Eberhard Bethge, is presently
preparing the official biography of his life, but the magnitude
of the work will delay publication for a number of years.

11

demanded by the war conditions of Germany.

Moreover, the impor-

tance afforded responsibility and obedience as ethical functions,
and his distrust of conscience as a moral guide, have some resem~lance

to the structure of his early education, his Lutheran

instruction and his father's views on human psychology.
Tutorial influences, evident and oonsistent throughout Bon~oeffer's

life, began with his study of theology and philosophy

at the University of Tubingen, 1923-24.
~ominant

~er's

Adolf Schlatter was the

theological influence on Bonhoeffer.

theology a biblical orientation.

He gave Bonhoef-

Bonhoeffer's personal

copies of Schlatter's works are filled with marginal notes and
~ere

referred to in the preparation of nearly all his later ser-

~ons

and exegeses.

Bonhoeffer's philosophical studies emphasized

epistemology and later he used the idealist theory of knowledge
~revalent

in the German universities as a defense against

a~

intrusion of philosophy into the area of ultimate reality.
!he following year, Bonhoeffer entered the University of
~erlin

to study under the men whose scholarship constituted a

~utheran
~arnack

renaissance.

Bonhoeffer was impressed by Adolf von

and Reinhold Seeberg, the latter being his academic advi-

~or.

However, the dominant inspiration during Bonhoeffer's doc-

~oral

study, in4eed, of his entire theological career, was Karl

~arth

whom he never had in class.

Bonhoeffer's diligent reading

of Barth's "Epistle to the Romans" and "Church Dogmatics" is
evident in Bonhoeffer's first dissertation which awarded him the
licentiate in theology at the early age of twenty-one.

The

12
Communion of Saints:··! DOgmatio Inquiry

~

the Sooiology .2!

the Church (1927) clearly shows Bonhoeffer's association with
Barth on the oentrality of Revelation and his alliance with the
majority of the Berlin faculty in reaotion to "Liberal Theology'!....
an eighteenth century humanization of the bible.

BY

January of 1928, Bonhoeffer had finished his first exami-

nation for the ministry and began his year of curateship in a
German parish of

Baroelon~,

Spain.

It was at this time that his

first formal concern with ethics is evidento

The pastoral work

of counselling required his occupation with moral problems.
Moreover, the method and problems that he aooepted theologically,
i.e., the dialectical theology common with Barth and the Reformation concern of relating gospel and law, necessitated an increasingly concrete and systematic explioation of dogma.

The advice

of Professor Seeberg at this juncture was catalytic.

He wrote

to his student that "the history of ethics and still more of
morality is a sphere in which a young man might well make a corner for himself today, perhaps with the aim of writing a history
of ethical dogma from the Sermon on the Mount up to our own
days.n9

Seeberg had directed Bonhoeffer's dissertation and must

have noticed the scattered references to ethios lO and judged them
9Dietr1ch Bonhoeffer, No Rusty Swords: Letters, Lectures

~,Notes 1928-1936, Vol. I,-ed. Edwin H. Robertson, trans. Edwin
~. Robertson and John Bowden (New'York: Harper and Row, 1965),

p. 360

lOThis dissertation touches on ethics but not with a degree
of purposefulness or organization that deserves comment here.
These references will be developed in the systematic analysis of

13
promising enough to suggest their development.

Just before leav-

ing Barcelona, Bonhoeffer addressed his congregation on "What Is
a Christian Ethic?tI,ll formulating his first organized attempt at
a theology of ethics.

Again, Bonhoeffer's approach was dialecti-

oal, and he committed himself to a solution of the dilemma stated
as the antithesis of gospel and law, of graoe and nature.

This

reoonoiliatory purpose displayed by Bonhoeffer's original statement on ethics is present throughout his work as its developmental forceo 12

The accurate statement of the relationship of the

Gospel and the Law was a primary motive behind Bonhoeffer's moral
theologyo
After a year in Barcelona, Bonhoeffer returned to Berlin to
write his inaugural dissertation, entitled Aot and Being. 13
later chapterso For the present, to substantiate the assertion
that Bonhoeffer's theological stUdies included ethical concerns,
see Bonhoefferts The Communion of Saints: A Do~atic Inquiry int~
the SOCiOlO~y of the Church, trans. R. Gregor mith (New York:
Harper and ow, 1963), ppo 23, 29, and 40 for comments on historioal ethical systems; pp. 32 and 35 for the ethioal element in
his anthropologyo
llNo Rusty Swords, ppo 39-48.
12Gerhard Ebeling assesses this problem as the key to Bonhoeffer's theologyo Word and Faith (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1963), chap. Iy-;-nDietrich Bonhoeffer."
13Fastor Zimmermann gives the following information about
the genesis of Act and Being: "For centuries after the Reformation the churches or-the German states were separated from real
life. They were governed by the states. In all that time, the
only alternative to the state ethics was pietismo In 1919, when
the Kirchenbund, a very loose federation of the independent provincial ohurches, established in 1871, finally got a little authority, and there could be such a thing as a church social ethic
that was different from the social ethic of the state, this independence created a lot of problems, because the Church had no

14
This thesis was necessary for acceptance into the theological
faculty of the University.

With its approval Bonhoeffer gave

his inaugural address, "Man in Contemporary Philosophy and Theology,,14 on July 31, 19300

These two efforts give Bonhoeffer's

most extensive reference to philosophy.

Through bibliography and

text they give valuable information concerning the sources accepted within his own position and his analysis of various philosophical systems.
Philosophy filters through Bonhoeffer's theological premises

0

Two fundamental concepts of Lutheranism are central to Bonhoeffer's search for rational categories capable of expressing the
content of revelation--that man is "incapax infiniti,,15 and that
the human heart is "curvum in se.,,16

Critical philosophy monopo-

lizes philosophical discussions, demonstrating Bonhoeffer's preoccupation with the late Modern period in the history of philosophy and his acceptance of the Kantian theory of knowledge.

That

human knowledge never grasps more than its own forms is consistent with these Lutheran dogmas and supports his conclusion of
experience in ruling itself. Bonhoeffer's book "Act and Beingtl
was concerned with this problem: What is a Christian ethic in
everyday life? This problem became all the more important when
the Church capitulated to the state once again, under Nazism ••• "
Metha, po 143.
14
No Rusty Swords, pp. 50-690
l5Act and Being, p. 83.
fer's inaugural lecture.

Also used three times in Bonhoef-

l6Act and Being, pp. 32, 47, 89, and 156. Also quoted once
in "Man in Contemporary Philosophy and Theology."

15
philosophy's

~inal

deficiency.

Bonhoeffer's familiarity with

this period of German philosophy testifies to both the philosophical exposure he had received academically and to a regulating
~actor

in his ethical theory, namely, that reason is incapable of

reaching objective reality or moralityo This position is proposed on a theological basis 17 and defended by the Kantian doctrine of man's epistemological isolation.
In recognizing this trend of thought and its origins it
should also be noted that these works show considerable study
and knowledge of publications on ethics.

Both individual works,

such as Max Scheler's Formalism in Ethics and an Ethic of Material Value, and presentations of a more general nature, such as
Wilhelm Windlebrand's History of Modern

Philosop~

Hirsch's Philosophies of Idealism, show

Bonhoef~er's

with ethical systems.

and Emanuel
familiarity

Investigation of these contrary positions

surely added precision and sharpness to the differences that
Bonhoeffer felt between "Christian ethics" and moral philosophy.
Furthermore, with the dialectic of historical systems, Bonhoeffer
clarified his own thought.
Before beginning a full-time position on the Berlin faculty,
Bonhoeffer received a Sloane Fellowship for post-docUral study at
Union Theological Seminary in New York.

In September of 1930,

Bonhoeffer arrived at Union Seminary to take courses and to
17"The thought imprisoned in itself, is the true expression
of man questioning himself (or the world) in statu corruptionis. ft
No Rusty Swords, p. 60.

16

absorb the American scene.

Two of the four papers extant from

this period concern ethics--"The Character and Ethical Consequence of Religious Determinism" and nThe Religious Experience
of Grace and the Ethical Life. n1B
This intensified activity in the area of ethics may be an
indication of the influence of Professor Eugene Lyman and the
practical quality of American philosophy.

Pragmatism was totally

foreign to Bonhoeffer's philosophical background, yet !the applied
his German vigour and determination to a mastery, particularly of
'Williams James, under Lyman's guidance.,,19

Besides this factor,

.inisterial work with the negroes of New York increased Bonhoeffer's sensitivity to the moral issue of racism due to his cultural appreciation of the negro mentality.

Only among the ne-

groes did Bonhoeffer hear the gospel "really preached and aocepted with great welcome and visible emotion."20

These two expo-

sures served Bonhoeffer well in the coming years.

The imprint of

William James' philosophy is evident in the sections on responsi~ility,

and the meaning of the future for ethical considerations

in the essays Bonhoeffer wrote from prison. 21

The negro problem

IBGodsey, ~. cit., p. 25.
191 Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 43.
20No Rusty Swords, p. 113. This observation is included in
Bonhoeffer's address giving his impressions on American theology,
called "Religion without Reformation."
21Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, ed.
Eberhard Bethse, trans. Reginald H. FUrler (New-rork: The Macmillan Co., 1953), p. 20 ffo

17
was analogous to the ethical decisions entailed in the Aryan
Clauses of the Third Reich.
Bonhoeffer stopped in Bonn on his return to Germany in late
July of 1931 in order to speak with Karl Barth.

Bonhoeffer's

high esteem for Barth and his theological position only increased
with this personal encounter. 22

Agreement existed between the

two scholars except in the area of ethics.

Bonhoeffer's own es-

timation of the disagreement is as follows:
We very soon came to the problem of ethics and had a
long discussion. He would not make concessions to me
where I expected that he would have had to. Besides
the one great light in the night, he said, there were
also many other little lamps, so called "relative ethical criteria;ff he could not, however, make their significance and application and nature comprehensible to
me--we didn't get beyond his reference to the Bible.
Finally he thought that I was making grace into a
principle and killing everything else with it. Of
course I disputed the first point and wanted to know
why everything else should not be killed. 2 3
This debate clarified Bonhoeffer's ethical stance to himself.

With the Barth-Bonhoeffer discussion, the main ingredients

of Dietrich's moral theory are evident.

From this pOint, the

development of Bonhoeffer's ethics was effected by external, environmental factors more than by intrinsic, logical deductions.
It is interesting that changing circumstances will give Bonhoeffer a concern for principles that are "relatively absolute,,24
22At this time, Bonhoeffer wrote to a friend, Erwin Sutz: ttl
don't think that I have ever regretted any thing that I have
failed to do in my theological past as much as the fact that I
did not come here [Bonn] sooner." No Rusty Swords, p. 122.
23No Rusty Swords, p. 121.
24Bonhoeffer, Ethics, ed. Eberhard Bethge, trans. Neville
Horton Smith (New York: The Macmillan Co •• lq6i;) D 2~q
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which at this time were incomprehensible to him.
On his return to Berlin, Bonhoeffer settled down to university life, but with a growing involvement in both the ecclesiastical and the political problems of Germany.

During his two

years as a Privatdozent or lecturer, Bonhoeffer conducted

course~

in the history of twentieth century systematic theology, the
nature of the church, creation and sin, and Christology, as well
as seminars on the idea of philosophy in Protestant theology,
Christian ethics, contemporary theological literature and
philosophy of religion. 25

Hegelt~

The content of these lectures is lost

except for the application that they found within Bonhoeffer's
ecclesiastical and ecumenical addresses. 26
It is necessary to realize the historical developments of
these crucial years, to see the significance of Bonhoeffer's
growing activismo

The power of Adolf Hitler was increasing and

having repercussions within clerical circles.
was split under the pressure.

The German church

One faction tended towards state

domination while the Confessing Church reacted to such external
motivation as un-Christian.

Much of this ecclesiastical infight-

ing was carried on through the organizations of the ecumenical
movement which further served the German resistance by publicizing the actual state of affairs, both religious and political,
25Godsey, 2£. cit., po 78 ff.
26Bethge has reconstructed the course on Christology from
student notes. His findings are contained in a volume called
Christ the Center (Harper and Row, 1960).
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within Germany.

With his appointment in September, 1931, as

Youth Secretary for the World Alliance for Promoting Internation-

!! Friendship through the Churches, Bonhoeffer officially entered
the ecumenical movement.

His university position, the completioI

of the draft of Creation and

!!1l,

and the theological basis of

his controversy with the National Christians, portray Bonhoeffer
as very much the scholar.

However, the political situation de-

manded ever more clear applications of Bonhoeffer's dogmatic
principles.
One such application was the "orders of preservation" that
Bonhoeffer developed during the Theological Conference for Ecumenical Youth Work in Berlin, April, 1932.

Professor Stahlin

and Pastor Peters of the State Church spoke for recognition of
the "orders of creation" in theology, which simultaneously could
be a foundation for the historical determinism that Nazism advocated.

In opposition, Bonhoeffer demanded recognition of the

fallen nature of the world and the action of Christ as the sole
justification of any order within this corrupted world.

These

"orders of preservation" are the source of Bonhoeffer's final
proposals on the

It

natural tt and the "Penultimate. tt

It is at this

point that Bonhoefferts ethics is cut off consciously and in
principle from any natural or rational criterion of right and
wrong, i.e., any Natural Law ethic.
Later that same year, Bonhoeffer gave a paper to the Youth
Peace Conference in Czechoslovakia on "A Theological Basis for
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the World Alliance?It. 2 7

He developed his ideas on the "orders of

preservation" and also denied the possibility of state intervention on the grounds of either the ambiguity of the gospel message
or the non-political character of Christianity.

The former as-

pect was a development of his Barcelona sermon on "The Question
of a Christian Ethic" and its investigation of the relationship
of gospel and law.

If the ambiguities of the bible were allowed

to inactivate the Christian, then the commandments were meaningless.

Therefore, Bonhoeffer proposes that the Law is always

concrete, always definite in this situation.

The reality of the

moment determines the various biblical attitudes and directives
on war to either "engage in this warn or lido not engage in this
war."

The gospel as preached today holds the unequivocal lawo

Moreover, the demand for Christian responsibility that was natural in such eventful times was developed as the Christian's necessary participation in the orders of preservation, or those conditions that are susceptible to the "new creation of Christ.1t

Bon-

hoeffer, then, takes exception to Kant's moral theory, though he
does not repudiate the Kantian theory of knowledge. 28

Bonhoeffer

holds that the nature of law as preached constitutes some things

27 No Rustl Swords, PPo 157-1730
28 In spite of Bonhoeffer's acceptance with the findings of
critical epistemology, he believed that Kant's development of
Formalism in morality was questionable. "It is wrong to say that
only the will can be good." No Rustl Swords, p. 171. As early
as The Communion of Saints, he had taken exceptionto Kant's
ethics, because "from many different starting points in his ethic
Kant could have destroyed his own epistemologyo" Communion of
Saints, p. 211, n. 60
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as goodo
In 1933, the situation in Germany rapidly deterioratedo
Hitler became Chancellor; the "German Christians tt gained 70% of
the vote in the General Church election and Ludwig Muller became
the national bishopo

Just two days after

Bon-

Hitler's~ection,

hoeffer attacked the "leadership principle lt in a radio broadcast 29 only to be cut off before the completion of the addresso
In this talk Bonhoeffer proposed the distinction between "ultimate" andt'penultimate" to categorize those authorities which have
an absolute or merely a relative claim to the Christian
The state

le~der

consci~a

was relegated only a relative authorityo

When

the state church accepted the Aryan Clauses which forbade church
office to the Jews, Bonhoeffer immediately attacked their unChristian premise 30 and worked with Martin Niemoller on a "Pastor's Emergency League" to help the clerical victims of this
anti-semitism.

Bonhoeffer's decisive analysis of Hitler's pro-

gram was remarkable in regard to the early stage and complexity
of Nazism.

Few saw the consequences to the state or church

caused by National Socialism, with such clarity as Bonhoeffer.
The consequent sense of responsibility carried Bonhoeffer from
the University of Berlin to a parish in London and the task of
interpreting the state of affairs in Germany to the world.

An

29No Rusty Swords, ppo 190-204~
30uThe Church and the Jewish Question," No Rusty Swords,
pp. 221-2290
--
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ethical system that not only distinguished the decisions possible but also carried one from the state of indecision to one of
responsible activity was necessaryo
Ecclesiastical Period, 1933-1939
Bonhoeffer's period of pure academic concern terminated
with his departure for a London pastorate.
of intense pastoral activity.

He thus began a time

This middle period bridged the

academician and the conspirator; it saw the transformation of th
theologian into a church spokesman.

Consideration of Bonhoef-

fer's ethical theory until 1933 is mainly of the influences of
home and university--his cultural, intellectual and religious
environment.

Theologically, Bonhoeffer's interests had centered

on the nature of the church.

In the transition to a more eccle-

siastical mode of activity, Bonhoeffer's theological attentions
focused on Hermeneutics and his ethical awareness intensified.
True, much of Bonhoeffer's ethics was implicit in the sources he
consciously or unconsciously accepted, but no systematic program
was given.
dogmatic.

Bonhoeffer's intentions and vocabulary were still
The conditions encountered during this second period

from 1933 to 1939 were to stamp Bonhoeffer's ethics with their
practical exigencies.
To approach this phase in the amplification of Bonhoefferts
thought, it is useful to make his position as rector of the Finkenwald seminary the context of discussiono

In this capacity,

Bonhoeffer was both the practical churchman, representin

the
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interests and intellectualism of the Confessing Church and the
pastor concerned with guiding the education and spiritual development of the seminarianso

His writings of this period can be

similarly classified by division into the articles and addresses
whose motive was church discipline and those longer works whose
purpose was spiritual direction even though both forms use the
method of biblical exegesis.

In these two respects, Bonhoeffer

attempted to practice the theory of his academic period, which
effort led to his conception of a major work in ethics.
The six years covered by this second stage are ones of growing disillusionment for the churchman.

They begin in London

with Bonhoeffer's introduction to the bishop of Chichester, a
leader of the World Alliance.

Together they planned a program

to bring the pressures available through the ecumenical movement
to bear on the internal affairs of Germany.

But, prophetically,

Bonhoeffer also was showing an interest in the resistance methods
of Mahat Gandhi.

Only the call from the Confessing Church to

lead their seminary in Pomerania prevented his journey to India~l
Four papers deserve mention as indicators of the mentality
of Bonhoeffer's ecclesiastical work: "The Confessing Church and
the Ecumenical Movement,u3 2 "The Question of the Boundries of the
31 Such interest was not new. At Barcelona Bonhoeffer read
extensively in Buddhism and he had planned to visit Gandhi in India at the end of his first American tour only to have his trip
cancelled when he could find no one to accompany him. Such interest was consistent with Bonhoeffer's own pacifistic position
towards a possible war effort by Germany.
3 2 No Rusty Swords, pp. 326-344.
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Church and Church Union,,,33 "Statements about the Power of the
Keys and Church Discipline in the New Testament,,,3 4 and "Our Way
According to the Testimony of Scriptureo lf35

With progressive em·

phasis, Bonhoeffer demands that the church is not an ideal or a
program (these are always ineffective).

It is not just a spiri-

tual influence but rather the hard reality of God's living word.
Consequently, what the times require is not "our own realization
of our own aims, but obedienceo,,3 6

Any legalism could corrupt

the Confessing Church, and therefore, Bonhoeffer's progressive
concern was that obedience to the Word and not adherence to any
principles was the spirit of Christian ethics.

Again, the prob-

lem of gospel and law, freedom and duty was central, though for
different reasons.
Early in 1938, Bonhoeffer showed literary signs of his grow
ing disenchantment with the church resistance due to internal
tensions and open Nazi oppression.

At this time he made his

first contacts with the political resistance.

Moreover, he arti-

culated this disappointment in his letter to the clergy of Pomerania saying, "The church struggle can be law or gospel.
moment it has becomelaw •••• ,,37

At the

The point at issue was the

33Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Way to Freedom: Letters, Lecturef
and
Notes
1935-19390 Vol. II, ed. Edwin H. Robertson, trans. Ed-...-Wl.n H~ Robertson and John Bowden (New York: Harper and Row, 1966
pp. 75-96.
34 Ibid., pp. 149-1600
35Ibid., ppo 173-193.
36 No Rusty Swords, p. 344.
37The Way to Freedom, p. 168.
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inability of the bible to define or justify a concrete plan of
action: Scriptural proof cannot be given to demonstrate the right
or wrong of a particular course or act.

The hesitation within

the Confessing Church while it searched Revelation for a directive was jeopardizing the whole venture.

To avoid this dilemma,

Bonhoeffer noted that the bible "is not meant to be an insurance
policy for our ways.n3 8

The indecision of the Confessing Church

was typical of a rationalistic ethic.

To Bonhoeffer's mind, the

only realistic and creative solution was responsible action done
in faith.

Ultimately, of course, this is the Lutheran doctrine

that man is justified by faith, not works, but this premise was
brought home emphatically by the experience of the Confessing
Church.
The Nazi effort to crush the opposition began in earnest
after the 1936 Olympics in Berlin and had two important results
in Bonhoeffer's mind: first, Nazism cut off the Confession from
its international contacts, and, secondly, Nazism restricted the
outlook of the Confessing Church to self-preservationo

In 1939,

Bonhoeffer left Germany in spite of the imminence of war, convinced that the Confessing Church's international contacts had to
be maintained.

Moreover, he did not want his pacifism to further

endanger the status of the Confession.
This was the final effort of the ecclesiastic to render the
church of the resistance effective.

However, the decision to
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leave Germany had important repercussions in Bonhoeffer's thought
The struggle of conscience deciding whether he was running away
or genuinely motivated in leaving Germany gave purpose and direction to his wish to write on Christian ethics. 39

The importance

of this mental battle in Bonhoeffer's estimation is contained in
the passages he added to his diary at this time.
It is remarkable how I am never quite sure about the
motives for any of my decisions •• o The reasons one gives
for an action to others and to one's self are certainly
inadequate. One can give a reason for everything. In
the last resort, one acts from a level which remains
hidden from us. So one can only ask God to judge us
and to forgive us. (20th June, 1939)40
However, he concluded he was wrong to come to America.

While re-

turning to Germany he added to his diary:
Perhaps I have learnt more in this month than in a
whole year, nine years ago; at any rate, I have acquired some important insights for all future decisions. Probably the visit will have a great effect
on meo (7th July, 1939)41
As a seminary director, there is an entirely different
dimension to Bonhoefferts work o

The years between 1933 and 1939

were concerned with preparing seminarians in their last year of
training for the ministryo

It was Bonhoeffer's duty to provide

a model of the Christian life both in regard to the seminary discipline and studyo

As rector, "Bonhoeffer never laid down any

39Bethge relates that "already at the time of completing hie
Nachfolge [The Cost of Discipleship (1937)1 Bonhoeffer was planning a new approach to the problems of ChrIstian Ethics."
Ethics, p. 110
40The Vay to Freedom, p. 233.
41 Ibid ., p. 2470
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rules.

He made up procedures as he went along and revised them

as practice required ••• He confided to Pastor Bethge that he also
distrusted theory in theology.,,42

As a pastor trying to describe

the mentality of the believer, Bonhoeffer tended to demand the
distinction of world and church which is not characteristic of
either his earlier work or his contemporary ecumenical writingso
The Cost of Discipleship explained Bonhoeffer's experience
at Finkenwald and the meaning that it had given the Christian
life.

This work is the clearest and longest effort of Bonhoef-

~er's

middle period and shows the function of Revelation in the

programming of one's behavioro

Belief must make a difference in

one's actions: grace is not cheap.

Implicit in the "yes" of the

believer is a "no" to the world as anything that hinders one's
confession.

Previously in his capacity as seminary director most

of Bonhoeffer's writings were devotional or liturgical, e.g.,
'King David," "Temptation," Life Together and a "Prayerbook of
~he

Bible."

However, The Cost of Discipleship rose from the

piblical study of the seminary's curriculumo 43
~iven

Its background is

by Bonhoeffer's report for 1936.
Lectures and exercises stand now, as ever, under the shadow of biblical worko After dealing with the II Discipleship
42Metha, p. 157.

43In a letter to Karl Barth on Sept. 19, 1936, Bonhoeffer ex
plained the academic concerns of Finkenwalde. "The chief ques~ions are those of the exposition of the Sermon on the Mount and
~he Pauline doctrine of justification and sanctification.
I am
engaged in a work [Cost of Discipleship] on the subject and I
fNould have asked and learnt a very, very great deal from you."
~ Way to Freedom, p. 116.
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of Christ" in the first course, the theme "The Visible
Church tf followed in the second, liThe New Life in Paul"
in the third and "Concrete Ethics in Paul lt in the present semester ••• I believe that a certain climax has
been reached with the present course. While I am writing this report, a two and a half day long disputation
is going on, from morning to evening, on ItThe Preaching
of the Law" ••• Our community is knit more closely together by this common work on a question which is so significant for our church todayo 44
Bonhoeffer's themes of the "hiddenness of Christian life"
or the "great divide lt between the church and the world,4 5 and his
ecclesiastical theme during this time differ.

However, the im-

pression should not be taken that there is no continuity in the
aspect of his thought.

The themes of "deputyship" and the iden-

tification of the faithful and the ethical life are contained in
Bonhoeffer's earliest dissertation46 and have precedents within
this second period as well. 47

The presentation of The Cost of

Discipleship shows the Lutheran orthodoxy that was a constant
factor in Bonhoeffer's writings.
Finkenwalde was closed in 1937, and the ever-increasing
pressure of the Gestapo gradually eliminated even those substitute training centers that the Confessing Church established.
44

Ibid., p. 125.

45See the table of contents, Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discirev. and unabridged ed., trans. R. H. Fuller (New York:
!The Macmillan Co., 1963), pp. 5-6.
~leship,

46Cf • Communion of Saints, p. 107.
47In his essay "The Interpretation of the New Testament,tl
Rusty Swords, ppo 308-325, Bonhoeffer suggests a science of
hermeneutics that if applied in the case of a concrete ethical
decision, would constitute ethics as post factum biblical reference.
~
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Bonhoeffer's operations were hampered at every turn; in 1936, he
was restricted from lecturing at the university, in 1937, travel
became difficult, and by 1939, his age group was about to be
drafted for military service.

Whereas Bonhoeffer's academic

period was crowned with success, this second period ended in
apparent failure with his doubt-filled resolve to leave Germany.
When he returned in July of 1939, it was to a new mode of activity and a different expression of his thought.
Politics and Prison, 1939-1945
The last division of Bonhoeffer's life that will be considered is that of 1940 to his execution in 1945.

The outlines of

is ethical theory have been given in his academic period; the
ethod and motive for his approach resulted from biblical emphasis and his experiences centering around the Finkenwalde Seminary.

The attraction to ethiCS, evident in both periods, comes to

fruition with the circumstances that Bonhoeffer faced in the last
ive years of his life.
By this time, ethics was seen as the conclusion of both his
heological work and necessity of his lived experience.

Eberhard

ethge who was Bonhoeffer's confessor during the time at FinkenaIde and confidant during the years in prison, says that
Already at the time of completing his Nachfolge [Cost of
Disci*leshi P (1937)J Bonhoeffer was planning a new approac to the problems of Christian ethics. He thought
of this as the beginning of his actual life work. In
June of 1939, he was invited by Professor John Baillie,
on behalf of the Croall Lectureship Trust, to lecture
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at Edinburgh, and he hoped to make his lectures the
basis for his book. The war put an end to his preparations and he did not take up this work again until
19400 48
Bonhoeffer was a careful thinker and he must have been
aware of the divergent trends of his thought.

In his first dis-

sertation he studied the sociological-empirical forms of the
church; in the Cost of Discipleship he devoted a whole chapter to
the "Hidden Character of the Christian Lifeo n49

As an official

Qf the Confessing Church he advocated involvement; as the pastor
pf Finkenwalde he demanded the separation of church and world.
ae writes glowing praise of Karl Barth and in the same letter con

~esses he is departing from his viewso 50

The compulsion to write

pn ethics systematically was partially caused by the need to
reconcile the many facets of his thought.
But the wish of the theologian for clarity and application51
was intensified by Bonhoeffer's duties in the resistance.

He had

48 Ethics, p. 11.

49The Cost of Discipleship, ppo 172-192.
50 The Way to Freedom, p. 116.
51While waiting to return to Germany from America in 1939,
outlined in his diary the "outstanding problems of pre
~ent continental theology" which he carried unresolved back to
rtermanyo He lists: "1) Confession and damnation, 2) the Church,
~) the powers ordained by God, 4) Christian life, the meaning of
~uffering, 5) Church and Synod, 6) Christ and Antichrist, and 7)
phristlike life." The ~ay to Freedom, p. 232. Such methodieal~ess is typical of~n oef?ir's mind and shows the range of ques~ions that went into the formulation of his Ethics.
~onhoeffer
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returned to Germany just before the outbreak of the Second World
Quickly, Bonhoeffer was forbidden to preach or publish; he

War.

was forced to relinquish all his duties regarding seminary training, and had to report regularly to the Berlin police.

Politi-

cally, he was a marked man and Bonhoeffer responded in August of
1940 by joining those conspiring against Hitler's regime.

He

obtained a position in the Abwehr or Military Intelligence Office
with the support of certain military opponents of Hitler, and
~egan

his tasks in the Counter-Espionage.

~inced

Bonhoeffer was con-

now that his political convictions and religious belief

could not be separated.
Although Bonhoeffer used his position to aid the Confessing
Church, his main task was political.
~luence

He used his ecumenical in-

to seek the Allied governments' terms of surrender in the

event that internal resistance could overthrow Hitler in May of
19420

By day he worked on Ethics and at night he met with the

~esistanceo

As a Christian he lied, stole and plotted the assas-

sination of Hitler.

This double life that Bonhoeffer led was a

problem to his conscience, and indeed, made him suspect even in
church circles.

tlWhen eventually he was imprisoned, his name did

Inot appear on the intercession list of the confessing church. ,,52
Bonhoefferts work in ethics--his conversations,53 his
5 2E• A. Robertson, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Richmond: John Knox
1966), p. 110

~ess,

53Wolf-Dieter Zimmermann speaks of Bonhoeffer's preoccupation
with the ethical problems of marriage and the family in 1939, and
with the question of Hitler's assassination in 1942. I Knew
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fragmentary book, his essays54 and letters while in prison-should be seen as expressive of his vision of a "worldly Christianityo"

Ethics is his example of the "non-religious interpre-

tation of theological conceptsotl

Ethics was written to show the

Christian how to accept the world

tt

ior.

come of age ,,55 in his behav-

Bonhoeffer's concern was to translate the will of God into

human terms; to allow the divine commandments to function in
moral deliberation.

Bonhoeffer's ethical system has been called

a "contextualist understanding of ethics,,,56 to indicate the
importance of the temporal situation in moral problem-solving.
This concrete ethic is demanded by Bonhoeffer's basic premise
that the Gospel-as-preached is always self-evident in terms of
its present meaning.

Thus, Ethics has a style and approach that

is different from earlier works even though they touch on the
same subjects.

The methodology of Ethics is not biblical exege-

sis--it is rather that fusion of fact and faith indicative of
Bonhoefferts life.
Bonhoeffer's life and theology are indispensible for
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 190. Oskar Hammelsbeck speaks of their
d1scussions on Natural Law. Ibid., p. 186.
54"The First Table of the Ten Commandments," in John D. Godsey, A Preface to Bonhoeffer (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965)
~p. 5'0-670
55The phrases in parentheses are taken from the letter of
June 8, 1944, addressed to Eberhard Bethge. Letters and Papers,
pp. 194-200.
56Alvin C. Porteous (ed.), Prophetic Voices in Contemporary
Theology (New York: Abingdon Press, 1966), p. 168-0-
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understanding his ethic.

As his life becomes more "secular,tI his

theology evolves to liberate the Christian for the world.
is the surest indication of this theological tendency.

Ethics

"All the

earlier works: the sociology of the Church, the methodology of
theology, the biblical concern for discipleship, the disciplines
of devotion--all these pointed to the Ethics.,,57
However, Bonhoeffer's theological premises were a foundation
that remained throughout his life.

He began from principles that

were limits to his thought in spite of his changing circumstances
and attention.

These principles are the ground for the continu-

ity that is evident in his thoughto

Once the starting points are

established, one thinks as he must in order to be consistent.

It

is precisely these preconceptions, the premises implicit and exp11cit in Bonhoeffer's work that must now be consideredo

57Martin E. Marty (ed.), The Place of Bonhoeffer (New York:
Association Press, 1962), po l~

CHAPrER II
THE RELATION OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY
IN BONHOEFFER'S ETHICS
The terminology that Bonhoeffer uses is basically theologicalo

An historical approach regarding his theology is necessary

in order to comprehend the intention and significance of his
concepts.

Seen from the perspective of Bonhoeffer's life, his

theology develops to its central enterprise in Ethics.

This is

the major work of that period in which Bonhoeffer attempted to
give faith a non-theological language and show the worldly stance
of Christianity.

Events developed in such a way that the schol-

arly, dogmatic theologian was compelled by Christian responsibility to assume the role of the counter-spy, plotting the defeat of
Hitler.

Consequently, Bonhoeffer's ethics is a conscious attempt

to give the world, the natural and the rational, a place in his
theology equal to that status it had in his everyday life.
Ethics is the result of this intention and the clearest summary
of Bonhoeffer's moral theory.

Many terms and expressions in his

ethical work, therefore, have a secular quality that is not present in his dogmatic theology.

However, the vocabulary of Ethics

is not an innovation that lacks continuity with Bonhoeffer's
early writings.

The non-biblical language of Bonhoeffer's moral
34
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theory is a development consistent with his correlation of
theology and philosophy_
Dualism in Thought
Theology is a perspective on reality and implies a notion
of truth which must be expressed in words.

Inherent in Bonhoef-

fer's notion of Christology, the heart of his theology, is a
conception of the relationship between faith and reason.

Bon-

hoeffer's ethics is one instance of his attempt to show the
falseness of any dichotomy between these two spheres.

To him,

the meaning of the Incarnation is the unity of all things "in
Christ."

Bonhoeffer's theology attempts to conceptualize this

Christic synthesis.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine

the basis of the correlation between theology and philosophy
established in the development of Bonhoeffer1s ethical system
and to see its application in at least one area--that of anthropology.
Bonhoeffer is a dialectical theologian o

Method alone,com-

its him to the synthesis of diverse elements within his theology
Thus, he is very critical of attempts to establish ontic boundaries between the different domains of lifeo

The antithesis of

church and state, of supernatural and natural, of faith and
reason is that type of dual thinking which could tolerate the
olitical tyranny of Hitler and cripple the usefulness of the
Confessing Church.
eing in Christian

The history of this dualism of thought and
Bonhoeffer and
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distinguished from his own position.
Since the beginnings of Christian ethics after the times
of the New Testament the main underlying conception in
ethical thought and the one which consciously or unconsciously has determined its whole course, has been the
conception of a juxtaposition and conflict of two spheres,
the one divine, holy, supernatural and Christian, and
the other worldly, profane, natural and un-Christian.
This view becomes dominant for the first time in the
Middle Ages, and for the second time in the pseudo-Protestant thought of the period after the Reformation. Reality as a whole now falls into two parts, and the concern
of ethics is the proper relation of these two parts to
each other.l
This trait of previous Christian ethical systems becomes a
point of departure for Bonhoeffer.

Such a conception is ntheolo-

gically speaking, to think in terms of laws,"2 while Bonhoeffer
hopes to free the Christian from rules and principles for God's
service.

If ethics is split between "ought" and "is," between

knowledge of good and evil, and between motives or consequences
as the determinants of the good, then ethics has separated reality and replaced its unity with a principle or a law of affinity.
~n

Christ, creation already has been reconciled.

From Bonhoef-

~er's

earliest address on ethics, he opposes any attempt to re-

~lace

Christ's mediation with static norms.
Ve will speak today of the basic questions raised by the
demand for a Christian ethic, not by making the attempt
to lay down generally valid, Christian norms and precepts
in contemporary ethical questions--which in any case is
completely hopeless--but rather by examining and entering
into the characteristic trend of contemporary ethical
problems in light of fundamental Christian ideas. The
reason for a limitation of this nature lies in the fact,
lEthics, p. 1960
2Ibid ., p. 199.
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that there are not and cannot 3 be Christian norms and
principles of a moral nature.
The reason for such distrust of principles and absolutes in
ethics is partly due to the moral flexibility required by the
ecclesiastical struggle within Germany.

Partly, the rejection of

universal norms stems from their inadequacy in Bonhoeffer's
experience.

In both respects the attempt to structure behavior

or determine the right course of action according to

~

priori

norms only resulted in the indecision and mental paralysis of
conflicting claims.

Even if the norms were so-called 'Christian tt

norms an obstructive deliberation about biblical interpretation
and contradictory commandments resulted.

The conscience operat-

ing on principles is a labyrinth of motives and consequences; it
indicates a radical disunity in thoughto

The fundamental reason

for the insufficiency of universal precepts of morality is that
they claim, implicitly, to grasp the eternal and infinite will of
God.

In effect, absolute directives and regulations split real-

ity into the good and the bad and define the relationship between
themo

This legalizes the will of God in the manner of the Phari-

sees 4 and every such attempt ends with enslavement to the Law.
"Ethical thinking in terms of the spheres then, is invalidated by
the faith in the revelation of the ultimate reality in Jesus
Christ. tt5
3"What is a Christian Ethic?tt No Rus1z Swords, po 40.
4"The Pharisee," Ethics, pp. 26-370
5EthiCS, p. 2000
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Besides the wish to avoid a dualism, Bonhoeffer's interest
in the relationship of theology and philosophy follows upon the
~ecessity

of knowing and communicating the gospel.

In ethics, as in dogmatics, we cannot simply reproduce
the terminology of the Bible. The altered problems of
ethics demand an altered terminology. But it must be
remembered that an extension of the terminology igvolves
the risk of slipping away from what is essential.
~onhoeffer

is aware that Christianity must be thought before it

pan be communicated
~uch

0

This requires an epistemology of faith.

need is realized even when criticizing theologians for their

philosophical usages, e.g., Tillich for his Existentialism? or
Barth for his Kantianismo 8
Bonhoeffer's second dissertation,

~

and Being, is a major

attempt to relate theology and philosophy because of the needs of
terminology.

The central problem is "one of forming genuine

theological concepts and choosing whether one is to use ontological categories in explaining them or those of transcendental
philosophy.tt9

The tentative conclusions of

!£:!?

and Being provide

a context for the eventual definitions of theology and philosophy
that Bonhoeffer proposed.
The Definition of Theology and Philosophy
UTheology is a function of the Church ••• theology is the
6Ibid ., p. 223.

~.
?"Man in Contemporary Philosophy and Theology,"
owords, ppo 58-60.
8Letters and Papers, p. 198

0

!!2

Rusty

9Act and Being, po 12.
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memory of the Church. ttlO
service of the Churcho"ll

It is "reflective knowledge in the
Theology is once removed from that

Actus Directus 12 which is the cognitive act of belief and which
is divinely effected.

Theology's function is to clarify the

transcendental revelation while realizing that it never grasps
this act by its reflection o

This inability of the mind to con-

ceptualize the pure revelation of God is emphatic in the case of
philosophy.
tion."13

"Per se, a philosophy cannot spare room for revela-

Systematic philosophy attempts to grasp total reality

but fails to do so because human nature has no potential, no
capacity for this divine act.
incomprehensible, i.e., God.
excluded from cognition.

Reason is limited by that which is
Therefore the ground of reality is

Critical philosophy attempts to limit

reason by reason which only reasserts its essential ego-centricitYo

The method of both theology and philosophy is reflective

analysis, but the former proceeds "from the truth," while the
latter moves "to the truth."
"Christian theology has to be conscious of its particular
premise, that is, the premise of the reality of God.,,14

Philos-

ophy, on the other hand, begins with the attempt to prove the
10Ibid. , p. 143.
llIbid. , po 150

0

l2 Ibid • , pp. l8lf.
l3 Ibid • , p. 70.

2!

l4Dietrich Bonhoeffer, "The Christian Idea of God," Journal
Religion, XII, 2 (April, 1932), po 1770
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existence of God.

Methods may be similar but these methods begin

at radically different starting points.

Theology starts with

God, while philosophy attempts to reach Him by its inevitable
presupposition that thought can find the truth and thus find Godo
Theology scientifically considers the category of revelation and
subjectively presupposes the state of faitho

Because theology

has a place for God, it is the critique of all philosophy, which
is inescapably restricted to the mental forms and incapable of
the infinite.

Theology, beginning with God-given knowledge can

conclude that "no religion, no ethics, no metaphysical knowledge
may serve to approach God.

They are all under the judgment of

God, they are the works of man. ,,15
Philosophy clarifies the modes of reflection, and, as such,
it is useful to theology.

Moreover, in accepting a systematiza-

tion of concepts a theologian inevitably associates himself with
some philosophy.

However, Bonhoeffer holds that even in its

capacity of linguistic analysis, philosophy "cannot be understood
without a theological background and therefore cannot provide any
axiomatic interpretation of the theologicaloooo" 16

Ultimately,

philosophical modes of thought are based on theological insights,
while theology has data that evaluates all systematic thought as
curvum in ~ corruptio mentis. l ?

Thus, the relation of Chris-

15 Ibid ., p. 1850
16No Rusty Swords, p. 980
l? t1 Self centered, the corruption of the mindol!
Swords, po 3?0.

No Rusty
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tian theology to philosophy is not static or determined; it is
not the case that one specific philosophical terminology is
necessary for the statement of revelation.

Theology begins with

divine knowledge, i.e., revelation as one instance of truth that
is imposed, free and objective.

The theologian can utilize any

philosophy that is humble and obedient to this intuition of
faith.
The question of the proper mode of theological expression
can be restated as: Is there a Christian philosophy?

Bonhoeffer

would answer that whatever philosophy is not closed to revelation
is Christian.

The only restriction on philosophical systems is

that they be critical, that they recognize their ineptness beside
the divine reality and make no claim to the final word on truth.
The discussion on the relationship of theology and philosophy has centered on epistemology.

Bonhoeffer's opinion is that

both theology and philosophy affirm reality as their proper
object, and the mode of knowing for each is systematico

However,

the theory of knowledge that theology develops is consciously
open to God while philosophy necessarily excludes the infinite
God.

Bonhoeffer develops this character of theological cognition

by considering its three-fold reception of revelation.
In understanding this [revelation] we first need to
distinguish between three ways of knowing ••• knowing as
a believer, knowing in preaching, and theological knowledge, of which the first may be called existential and
the others ecclesiastical cognition. i8
l8Act and Being, p. 1370
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Existential knowing is never captured in reflection; it is the
intuition of the person of Christ and is a divine gift.

If

rationality grasps the divine reality, then ethics becomes a way
from man to God; the mediation of the Word of God and the fact
of grace would be superfluous.

"Thought, even theological

th~t

will always be systematic by nature and can therefore never comprehend the living person of Christ .. ,,19

And yet ecclesiastical

knowledge is different from philosophical modes of thought
because "there is obedient thinking and there is disobedient
thinkingo,,20

Theology, therefore, entails ~ posteriori forms of

knowing while those of philosophy are "disobedient" because they
are

~

priori.
Although not as pronounced as the epistemological discussion

on theology and philosophy, there is a definite metaphysical
position underlying Bonhoeffer's correlation.

Bonhoeffer means

to use an ontological as well as cognitive analysis of theology
and philosophy.

One facet of Bonhoeffer's theology is concerned

with the possibilities of Natural Theology, that philosophical
discipline which most closely approximates theological study.
Bonhoeffer denies the existence of a rational approach to God,
not only because it is a hopeless attempt to comprehend the
Infinite, but because there is no chain of being that will support this analogia entis.
19Ibid ., po 146.
20 Idem •

God cannot be an object of philosophi-
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cal thought because He has no metaphysical relationship to creation.

"Creator and creature cannot be said to have a relation of

cause and effect, for between Creator and creature there is neither a law of motive nor a law of effect nor anything else.

Be-

tween Creator and creature there is simply nothing: the void.,,21
It is impossible to speak of teleology or causality in this
fallen world as either a cognitive or metaphysical approach to
God, because only the will of God incarnate in the Son of God can
effect such an approach.

Bonhoeffer proposes an "analogy of re-

lationshiptl and the Itorders of Preservation" since the natural
structures of thought and being tlhave no value in themselves.
They are accomplished and have purpose only through Christ." 22
Thus, Bonhoeffer excludes philosophy from certain subject matter,
i.e., an Infinite Being, for reasons that will be seen to have
consequences within his ethics.
It is evident that ultimately the question of the relation
of theology and philosophy is one of Christology.
analysis both stand on the judgment of God.
~ight

In the final

Any definition that

oppose these modes of reflection is indicative of dUalistic

~hinking

or thought in terms of two spheres.

Even though the

pharacter of theology is revelational while philosophy is rationaI, Bonhoeffer maintains that "The 'supernatural' is only in the
21Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall: Temptation, ed.
Eberhard Bethge, trans. John E. Fletcher and Kathleen Downham
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1959), po 180
22 Ibid ., p. 880
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natural, the holy only in the profane, and the revelational only
in the rational.,,23

Christ is the unity that draws all seeming

opposites together.

Theology and philosophy are not identical,

but both realize their truth and being only as facets of the
"new creation" in Christ.

Note that Bonhoeffer justifies his

definition of these two disciplines by an appeal to faith; his
formulation of ethics will be sustained by a similar appeal.
The autonomy and isolation of reason is Bonhoeffer's philosophical objection to an independent science of philosophy.
"This fact of the captivity of human thinking within itself, that
is to say, of its inevitable autocracy and self glorification as
it is found in philosophy, can be interpreted theologically as
the corruption of the mind, which is caused by the first Fall.,,24
The state of man's mind only demonstrates the ontological condition of man in statu corruptionis.

Theology begins with revela-

tion, and so it can grasp the impact of the Original Sin and the
Redemption on human nature, just as it realizes the difference
between actus reflectus and actus directus in the mind.

tlBecause

our existence is not in unity our thinking is torn apart as
well",,25
Anthropology
If one is to question either man himself or the works of man
23Ethics, po 198.
24t1The Christian Idea of God,1t p. 178.
25Creation and Fall, p. 570
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such as theology and philosophy, with ultimate seriousness, he
must inquire before God.

Every attempt of reason is limited to

its own structures and therefore every philosophical anthropology
defines the nature of man simply by the manner in which it asks
~ts

questions.

~ilities
~l

If man attempts to know himself from his possi-

or his limitations, the two alternatives open to ration-

psychology, he cannot escape the fact that he is a part of the
In Bonhoeffer's mind, the attempt by philosophy to

~uestiono

~efine

human nature is the futile attempt of thought to transcend

~hought,

and of man to transcend himself by objectifying himself.

fl1'hilosophy, therefore, means the question of man and its answer

~ll in one,fl 2 6 since it is man's effort, figuratively, to lift
pimself by his bootstraps.
The philosophical problem of man has developed from the
of his achievements and limits.

~xperience

~bstraction

~he

from that theological understanding which begins from

pervasive unity of Christ the God-man.

~ssential

~ional

This polarity is an

To Bonhoeffer, any

definition to man that does not account for his inten-

relationship to God is an instance of the splitting of

reality into two dimensions.

ItNothing can be known of either God

pr man before God has become man in Jesus Christ. fl27
~n

Thus, it is

Christ that humanity finds its proper proportiono
26No Rusty Swords, p. 51 •.

27Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Christ The Center, ed. Eberhard
Bethge, trans. John Bowden (New York: Harper and Row, 1966),
p. 105.
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The primordial sin changed man's nature because it changed
God's relationship to mano

Original Sin disuni£ied human nature

and severed it £rom its origin and destiny.
state, man's essence is sin. 28

In this corrupted

On the other hand, Redemption is

a new creation, and re-establishes the truth o£ human nature as
creaturehood.

The man of £aith has a new nature.

In short, "The

being of man has no £ormal, metaphysical, psychological properties dissociable £rom the proposition that 'man is either in
Christ or in Adam,.tt 2 9
The theological anthropology thus advocated by Bonhoe££er is
~ased

on biblical, Lutheran inSights.

~ature

This conception o£ human

is consistent with his rejection o£ any duality in reality

and his correlation o£ theology and philosophy.

Grace and sin

~re

ontological categories to Bonhoe££er and £orm the ground £or

~he

Christian concept o£ man's being.

~nterprets

and harmonizes all other evidence concerning

epistemology and anthropology.
~ill

Faith gives evidence which
cosmolo~

The absolute and unrestricted

o£ God constitutes all nature by its £ree acceptance or

~ejection.

Yith this voluntaristic conception o£ God 30 "all

28n'In Adam' means in untruth, in culpable perversion o£ the
twill (the human essence) inwards to the sel£--.£,2£ eurvum in ~.n
~ ~ Being, p. 156.

29 Ibid., p. 148.
30 It is not the purpose o£ this chapter to discuss this

notion o£ God except £or its importance as a presupposition of much o£ Bonhoe££er's work on the correlation o£
~heology and philosophy.
This assertion may be verified in Creation and Fall, pp. 38-39, and No Rusty Swords, p. 46. In The--communIOn of Saints, p. 31, BoDhoe£fer criticizes Idealism~
~oluntaristic
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metaphysical ideas of eternity and time, being and becoming,
living and dying, essence and appearance must be compatible.,,3 1
Thus, man's being is determined by its unity with or separation
from the plan of God as "being-in-Christ" or "being-in-Adam. tI
It should be recognized that Bonhoeffer's understanding of
the will of God as contained in the person of Christ is fund amental to his conception of the nature of man and the ethical
dimensions of that nature.

Neither nature nor any operation of

nature has any ontological status or value

in~.

The uncondi-

tioned, unmotivated freedom of God is Bonhoeffer's premise in
reconciling the two spheres.

It is a necessary premise for mak-

ing faith prior to the fruitful and proper use of reason and for
denying a doctrine of analogy32 that would give human nature an
intrinsic goodness.

If man is conceived to have some independent

inherent teleology, or if human actions can be categorized as
objectively good or bad, then the will of God has been restricted
and determined.

Bonhoeffer objects to any general theory of

being which denies the contingency of God's revelation or establishes a human reality that is independent of God's eternally new
decisiono

Such conceptions would deny the freedom of God.

In his discussion of the relation of theology and philosophy
ethics and anthropology for having "no voluntarist concept of
Godo" It is the will of God that imposes obligations upon man
and constitutes the truth value of human reason rather than some
ontological structure.
31 Act and Being, po 1720
32Ibid., ppo 68-69.
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Bonhoeffer opts for a Christian use of reason.

Therefore, when

he discusses the nature of man, Bonhoeffer proposes a theological
anthropology.

Both of these assumptions are the result of what

Bonhoeffer considers to be the Christian idea of Godo

Man is

what the infinite and transcendent God now wants him to beo

The

Christian concept of the person is man-after-the-Fall, and is the
only notion which is consistent with the "absolute distinction
between God and man. ";.;

The moment of faith is regarded as the

revelation of this absolute difference.

Belief establishes man's

being as being "in Christ" and becomes the central reference
point for Bonhoeffer's ethics.

Belief recovers the unity of man

with his origin and destiny and therefore Christian ethics can
speak to the whole man.

An ethic based on this anthropology,

furthermore, intends not to call man to some ideal or "otherworldliness" but to be truly humano
By asserting the void between Creator and creature, Bonhoeffer means to confirm their unity and reconciliation in the
life of Christo

The final "oneness" of reality in the Incarna-

tion has a crucial function for Bonhoeffer's ethical purposeso
~

system that opposes faith and reason by constructing an ethic

of pietism or formalism is clearly invalid.

The irresponsibility

~ngendered

by thinking in terms of two dimensions and universal

~rinciples

is overcome.

In this framework, deputyship cannot

end at some artificial boundary.

Furthermore, if the proper

33 The Communion of Saints, p. 31.
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being of man is "in Christ," there is an anthropological basis
for both faith and reason to provide ethical direction as well
as a foundation for non-biblical terminology in Christian ethicso
In summary, Bonhoeffer was a theologian whose idea of God
prompted him to assert an infinite gap between God and the world.
On the other hand, Bonhoeffer's concept of the Word of God committed him to reconcile all in Christo

He maintained a "polemic

unity ft3 4 between thought open to grace (theology) and thought
closed to grace (philosophy); just as there is a polemic unity
of being-in-Christ and being-in-Adam.

However, it is important

to realize that the point of unity is given by faith.

Only be-

lief in Christ specifies the proper use of philosophy; only
faith shows the true nature of man.

There could be no science

of morality independent of the data of Revelation.

It remains

to be seen what real significance that reason or non-biblical
evidence can have within Bonhoeffer's ethico

The relationship

between theology and philosophy, between the supernatural and the
natural, is not one of equals.
subjugated to faith.

Reason seems to be dependent and

It is necessary therefore, to investigate

very closely the attempts of Bonhoeffer to account for the
rational and the natural within his ethics.

It remains a ques-

tion whether the tension felt within the theoretical foundations
of Bonhoeffer's relationship of theology and philosophy will
occur in the practice of his Ethics.
34Ethics, p. 199.

CHAPTER III
THE DISTINCTION OF PENULTIMATE-ULTIMATE
IN BONHOEFFER'S ETHIC
Bonhoeffer spoke in terms of the penultimate-ultimate distinction when he attempted to specify the place of reason in
ethics.

In Bonhoeffer's view, faith was not opposed to reason o

Rather, the unity of all life's dimensions in Christ prompted
Bonhoeffer to analyse the exact relationship between the insights given by Revelation and those given by rational deliberationo

He hoped to revitalize the concept of the "natural" withiI

Lutheran moral theology by the categories of the penultimate and
the ultimateo

These same categories make the temporal situation

essential to the consideration of moral "behavior.

In effect, thE

penultimate-ultimate distinction attempts to conciliate a natura]
law theory and a situation ethico
In the preceding analysis of Bonhoeffer's relation of faith
and reason, and his exposition of human nature, the premises of
his Christian ethics were giveno

Bonhoeffer insists upon the

foundation of Christology but equally upon the affinity of Christianity and humanism o

It is only by faith that man attains the

ultimate perspective that makes his activity ethically significant.

The purpose of this chapter, then, is to see the concrete
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ethical program proposed by Bonhoeffer on the basis of these
hypotheses.

The definition and meaning of the "ethical," the

place of faith in moral discourse and, finally, the attempt of
Bonhoeffer to make the natural orders ethically relevant will be
the order of study.

-The

Problem of Ethics

-

It is important to understand the problems that Bonhoeffer
hoped to alleviate with his ethical proposals.
ally determines the character of the remedy.

The protiem usuThe estimation of

Bonhoeffer's achievements in Ethics is vitally connected with the
difficulties that he considered in its formulation.

The positive

and negative elements which are organized into Bonhoeffer's definition of ethics are pivotal to any interior criticism, as they
are the criteria he himself sets for the evaluation of his ethicso
A theological foundation for ethics was a progressive concern within the wider development of Bonhoeffer's theology.

His

aim of showing the concrete nature of revelation logically concluded with the study of morality.
theological purpose to Ethics.

Thus, there is a strictly

"The problem of Christian ethics

is the realization among God's creatures of the revelational
reality of God in Christ, just as the problem of dogmatics is the
truth of the revelational reality of God in Christ." l

In this

sense, Ethics is Bonhoefferts attempt to summarize his thought
lEthics, p. 190.
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by drawing the conclusions and implications of his initial positions on the nature of the Church and Christology.
Moreover, the Lutheran concern with the relationship of
Gospel and Law--the dogma of justification by faith--was another
theoretical problemo

The study during the Finkenwalde period had

not resolved the exegetic difficulties of the significance of the
commandments and ethical directives in the gospel.

Law is enig-

matic since Christ proclaimed the Christian's freedom from the
law.

The nature of a Christian commandment needed exposition if

faith and not works was to be the criterion of salvation.
Besides these methodological aims, Bonhoeffer's experience
convinced him of the failure of previous ethics.

Not the absence

but the abundance of ethical systems contributed to the moral
confusion of the era of the Great Depression and the two World
Wars.

The problematic was evident to him in the success of Hit-

ler and the advent of the Third Reich.

The ethical attitudes

which history proved to be ineffective also contributed to Bonhoeffer's positive hopes for his ethics.

The ethical systems

that attempted tohandle Nazism were like "rusty swordse,,2

Bon-

hoeffer compares them to the figure of Don Quixote, dressed in
ridiculous armour and fighting for a non-existent ladyo

On two

occasions 3 Bonhoeffer itemized the ethical systems that history
had tested and broken.

Rationalism is too idealistic to have a

2Ibido, p. 680
3Letters and Papers, pp. 17-19, and Ethics, ppo 65-670
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concrete effect on the world.

Moral fanaticism is more concernea

with virtue than the conditions which make it possible and so is
entangled in non-essentials.

Devotion to conscience results in

indecision and ineffectiveness.

Duty ends in avoiding responsi-

bility and a slavish imitation of the past.

If freedom is one's

sole ethical principle it becomes self-assertion since it is an
immature criterion of choosing among alternativeso

In essence,

each of these attitudes is imitation of the Law, and confines
ethics to the limits of some principle.

The history of ethical

theory, therefore, is a negative factor contributing to Bonhoeffer's purposes in moral theology.

Bonhoeffer, however, sees the

need for the gospel in liberating man for a creative encounter
with changing circumstances.
These theoretical and practical difficulties with ethics
should be considered in the light of Bonhoeffer's aim of reconciling all the facets of life into the reality of Christ.

He is

stating his goals and expectations when he says that "after
Christ, Ethics can have but one purpose, namely, the achievement
of participation in the reality of the fulfilled will of God.,,4
Ethics, then, is that science which determines the way that "the
present is taken up by God in Christ.,,5
Conformation
Bonhoeffer's notion of the problems with past ethical
4Ethics, p. 212.

5ill£.,

po 89.
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theories is explanatory of the means he formulated to overcome
them.

.Central to his technique is the concept of "conformation. I

Conformation is the goal of morality.

Reality has a structure

and so do ethical systems; the Christian structure is Christ.
But conformation should not be understood as a pietistic "being
like Christ" but rather it is that inner transformation that
actually accomplishes the immediate mind and work of Christ.
Just as Bonhoeffer objects to an ethic of universal prinCiples,
he opposes any attempt to make the gospel a new law or norm to
impose arbitrarily upon the changing world.

Christian ethics is

a formative process which realizes the shape of Christ in today's
world.

Conformation is not a process that subjugates all the

natural forms of life, but rather accepts them all within the
teleology of Christ.

As an ethical term, conformation is that

style of human life which is most truly human and whose expression is the most adequate to all the dimensions of reality.

Bon-

hoeffer's theory of conformation attempts to specify the ethical
funct,ion of faith.
Conformation is the program that combines simplicity and
wisdom, and by so doing replaces the ineffective ethics of the
past.

Simplicity is that being-in-Christ which was mentioned as

the anthropological basis of Bonhoeffer's ethics.

It is that

single-mindedness that searches only the will of God for guidance
Because the simple man

111 00 ks

only to God, without any sidelong

glance at the world, he is able to look at the reality of the
world freely and without prejudice o

And that is how simplicity
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becomes wisdomo fl6

Conformation is effected by the harmony of

both the divine and the natural in human behavior.
The divine effectiveness in conformation is expressed by
Bonhoeffer's sections on the commandments.

The commandment of

God is the object of Christian ethics,? because it is the foundation of the "ethical."

It is the light of permission that cuts

through the dark motives and desires of the conscience.

It must

not be fragmented into various ethical directions but be realized
as "the permission to live as man before God.
of God is permissiono
commands freedom. uB

The commandment

It differs from all human laws in that it

Moreover, the fact of the divine commandment

establishes forms of superiority and inferiority all through life
This structure is the warrant or authority for any ethical discussion.
Conformation

as based on the command of Christ demonstrates

Bonhoeffer's requirement for a social perspective in ethics.
Ethics is not written by or for the isolated individual struggling alone with his decisions.
isolation.

There is no ethical behavior in

The locus of conformation in Christ is a visible

community.
Ethics as formation is possible only upon the foundation
of the form of Jesus Christ which is present in His
Church 0 The Church is the place where Jesus Christ's
6 Ibid ., po 680
?Ibid., p. 2??
8 Ibid ., p. 281.
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taking form is proclaimed and accomplished. It is this
proclamation and this event that Christian ethics is
designed to serve09
The ethical choice is never secluded since it takes shape in a
situation that is essentially social by revelational precept.
When explaining the meaning of conformation, Bonhoeffer
shows that his theory is a type of "situation ethic. tI

"Ethical

problems of content can never be discussed in a Christian light;
there is simply no possibility of erecting generally valid principles, because each moment lived in God's sight, can bring an
unexpected decision."lO

A timeless, placeless ethic is adoles-

cent; the splitting of human possibilities into good and bad is
immature.

Any system that gives general validity to moral prin-

ciples does not realize the infinite variation of the form of
Christ's commandment in history.

The respect for each situation

which denies a systematic knowledge of right and wrong is evident
in The

~

of Discipleship and its attempt to explicate the Ser-

mon on the Mount.

The life of discipleship forbids an abstract

ethic but requires obedience in the concrete situation.

"To fol-

low in his steps is something that is void of all contento

It

gives us no intelligible programme for a way of life, no goal or
ideal to strive aftere"ll

The configuration with Christ is not

an alien mold, shaping man according to this ideal or that end,
9Ibid ., p. 88.
lO"What is a Christian Ethic?", !!,o Rusty Swords, po 460
llCost of Discipleship, p. 620
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but is the real form of man in historyo
"Responsibility" is the human element in conformation; it is
the human acceptance and accomplishment of God's will.

Respon-

sibility is that freedom which refuses to hide behind principles,
or authorize one's behavior by anything other than one's personal
judgment.

The responsible person knows ethical success in the

risk of action and not in intense deliberation.

"Responsibility

is the total and realistic response to the claim of God and of
our neighbor, ••• it shows in its true light how the response of a
conscience which is bound by principles is only a partial one. tt12
Responsibility realizes the freedom of obedience to the form of
Christ, and accepts only the genuine obligations of divine mandate and human need.

Conscience is an isolating factor, and in-

capacitates man with norms and rules.

However, man's conscience

is freed and unified by Simplicity and wisdom when it is informed
by Christ.

The responsible man willingly incurs the guilt resul-

ting from the law broken in response to Christian values.

Final

judgment on motives or consequences is not given by an individual's sense of righteousness.

"The man who acts in the freedom

of his own most personal responsibility is precisely the man who
sees his action finally committed to the guidance of God.,,13
This is the meaning of Luther's dictum to sin boldly, but believe
more boldly.
l2Ethics, p. 245.
l3Ibid ., p. 249.
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Bonhoeffer gives an example of the contextual and social
character of conformation in his chapter on "What is meant by
'Telling the Truth?' ,,14

Truth is different in different situa-

tions; the truth value of a statement depends on the relationship, place, context, subject matter, etc., in which it occurs.
The truth between a parent and a child is often a lie outside of
the family.

Telling the truth is not just a matter of moral

character or conscience; it cannot be defined as the correspondence of the mental and verbal.

Absolute factual statement often

can be cynical and cruel whereas the truth is "also a matter of
correct appreciation of real situations and of serious reflection upon them. ,,15
The responsibility to tell the truth cannot be defined outside of the interpersonal situation that demands it.

Objective

structures of the lower and the higher are sociological fact.
This framework of natural hierarchies is justified by divine
command, and accepted in the manifold personal relationships of
authority and obedience as the ethical domain.

"The ethical is

not essentially a formal, rational principle but a concrete relation between the giver and the receiver of commands. ,,16

There-

fore, truth is required and specified by the authority preserved
in the order of nature from its corresponding subordinate.
14Ibid ., pp. 363-3720

15 Ibid ., p. 3640
16Ibid ., p. 2730
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Furthermore, the warrant or authorization for all ethical discussion depends upon the existence of an Itoffice" or a polarity of
authority and obedience in society.

The truth value of a state-

ment depends not only upon "what" is said but upon "who" says it.
Bonhoeffer's theory of conformation makes the situation a
relevant factor in moral considerations.

However, it would be a

misunderstanding of Bonhoefferts doctrine to think that the context signifies the subjective and radically particular quality
of each moral choice. 17

Rather, the situation is an objective

factor in ethical decisions and can be sociologically analysed.
The "situation" of ethical discussion is always the concrete form
of human life which is established by divine decree.

The rela-

tionships intrinsic to the natural life are those forms or communal structures which state the place and location of man's rights
and duties.

The ethical demands relationships of superiority and

inferiority, of rights and obligations, of freedom and obedience.
The natural world contains divinely commissioned orders that
correlate permission and prohibition and provide the warrant for
ethical discourse in these areas.

These authority-obedience

forms are called ttmandates tl by Bonhoeffer, and they specify the
situational aspects of conformation.
17Joseph Fletcher criticises Bonhoeffer for legalism and
casuistry which is contrary to the "situational" character of
Ethics. Cf. Situation Ethics: ~ ~ Morality (Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, 1966), p. 38. Fletcher has simply not
understood the dogmatic sociology implied by Bonhoeffer's meaning of the term "context" or Itsituation.ft
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This relativeness of the world to Christ assumes concrete
form in certain mandates of God in the world. The Scripture names four such mandates: labour, marriage, government and the church. 18 We speak of the divine mandates
rather than of divine orders because the word mandate
refers more clearly to a divinely imposed task rather
than to a determination of being. It is God's will that
there shall b~ labour, marriage, government and church
in the worldo 1 9
God's commandment--the basis of all right and duty because it is
the basis of man's relationship to God--confronts man in four
different but unified forms.

These mandates are the commission

that gives the Christian freedom, since obedience in the context
of labour, marriage, government and the church establish a concrete relationship to the Transcendent.

The dynamism and vital-

ity of the mandates when regarded as tasks instead of as metaphysical determinations or orders, locate man's ethical responsibilitieso

The mandates express tithe reality of the love of God for

the world and for men.,,20

The function of the mandates is Bon-

hoeffer's most concrete effort to block any "Christian tt retreat
from the secular.
The structure of the responsible life--its correspondence
with reality, freedom, social awareness, willingness to accept
guilt and obedience--is the many-sided attitude of the Christian
to his vocation of conformation with Christ as received in baptism
18Bonhoeffer is slightly inconsistent in his specification
of the mandates. A later consideration in Ethics lists them as
the church, marriage, culture and government. (p. 286f.)
19Ethics, p. 207.
20Ibido, p. 288.

61
To the individual, the orders of this world are a responsibility;
to Christ's view, they are a calling.

One's vocation is that

place where deputyship is exercised, where God's commandment is
heard.

The notion of conformation reconciles these different

areas of activity commanded in Christ and accomplished in responsibilityo

Conformation is the end of ethics; the mandates are

the Christian's means for formation in Christ.

Bonhoeffer's

ethical program, then, opens the door to eontent,21 i.eo, natural
values.
~

Ultimate and Penultimate

Formalism, as an ethical approach, was susceptible to the
disjunction of intention and execution.

Bonhoeffer rejected this

position that good intentions alone make a person moral.

Formal-

ism had been used by Christians to justify their avoidance of the
political questions of the Third Reich.

In fact, formalism led

Karl Barth to a "position of revelation.,,22

Bonhoeffer's concept

of conformation, however, includes an experiential and theological effort to account for the world and express this concern in
non-biblical language.

The form of Christ is specified by the

Christic structure of life.

Thus, Bonhoefferts most concrete

21 The denial of content for Christian ethics that Bonhoeffer
requested in his Barcelona lecture (Supra, p. 55f.) was modified
by the time Ethics was written. His objections to Kantian formalism and his growing desire to concretize revelation are operative in the specific precepts contained in his final work on
ethics.
22Letters and Papers, p. 1980
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proposals for a new ethic are centered upon his attempt to incorporate the preserved orders of the natural world into moral discussions.

"One of his distinctive contributions to theological-

ethical terminology is the paired concepts of the 'ultimate' and
the 'penultimate·.,,2 3
The ultimate--faith and divine justification--may not obliterate the penultimate or those conditions that are the
~

of belief.

~

qua

The ultimate or conformation is the end of ethi-

cal behavior while the penultimate is the means o

The form of

Christ is achieved only within the natural and the rationalo
Faith is never realized except in and through the historical and
material preamble.

The Lutheran doctrine of the justification of

the sinner by faith alone--this is the last word, the ultimate of
Christian life.

However, "the Christian life means neither a

destruction nor a sanctioning of the penultimateo

In Christ the

reality of God meets the reality of the world and allows us to
share in this real encountero,,24
The relationship and nature of the penultimate as regards
the ultimate is crucial to the understanding of one of Bonhoeffer's aims.
and

He wishes to put content and circumstance into ethWs

ope~morality

to the Christian appreciation of the worldo

As

is consistent with Bonhoeffer's Christology and dialectical

23Franklin Eugene Sherman, "The Problem of a 'Trinitarian
Social Ethic rn (Unpublished PhoDo dissertation; Dept. of Theolog~
University of Chicago), po 142.
24Ethics, p. 133.
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method, the point of intersection is the reality of Christ who
loved the fallen world and re-directed it towards the unity of
the divine volition.
The penultimate is not a state or condition in itself, but it is a judgment which the ultimate passes upon
that which has preceded it. Concretely, two things are
called penultimate in relation to the justification of
the sinner by grace, namely, being man and being good •••
For the sake of the ultimate the penultimate must be preservedo Any arbitrary destruction of the penultimate
will do serious injury to the ultimateo 2 5
In considering this relationship it is helpful to remember
Bonhoeffer's previous study of the relation of ends and means in
The Cost of Discipleship.

He advised that ends should always be

the summation and total of their constitutive elements.

A con-

clusion is reached only through the necessary process of premise
and reasoning.
cedes it.

A statement's truth depends on the data that pre-

A declaration, for instance, that man knows nothing,

is valid only if it is the "answer to a sum,tI and "the outcome
of long experience. n26
such a declaration.

Only a life of diligent study can lead to

When such an assertion is made by a college

freshman to excuse academic laziness, the conclusion becomes a
premise, breaking the necessary sequence of ends to means.
out the proper warrant, a directive invalidates itselfo

.

With-

Thus,

the ultimate is what it is, the last word, only if it is preceded
by the penultimate.
To make the function of the penultimate relevant within

25 Ibid., ppo 133-340
26Cost of DiSCipleship, p.

55.
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Christian ethics and to realize its importance as an ethical criterion, Bonhoeffer introduced the concept of the "natural" into
Protestant ethics.

The natural gives shape to the penultimate.

The natural is "the form of life preserved by God for the fallen
world and directed towards justification, redemption and renewal
through Christ.

The natural is, therefore, determined according

to its form and according to its contents." 27

In other words,

the natural is not the antithesis of the supernatural.
would split reality into two forms.

This

The natural should be con-

trasted to the unnatural which is that chaotic element in the
fallen world which opposes Christian direction.

The natural is

the form immanent to life and is an end and a means; it suggests
active participation in the orders of preservation and creaturehood.

As an end, the natural has inherent rights; as a means it

has duties imposed upon it.
Before considering the rights and obligations of the

natural~

however, it is necessary to determine the extent of man's knowledge of the natural.
preservation?

Does human reason comprehend the orders of

In effect, the natural is the human knowing of the

"things before the last" or the penultimate.

Reason is man's

recognition of the penultimate as natural; it is the form of consciousness which corresponds to the form of being of the preservec
world.

Reason also is fallen and as an order of the natural has

no privileged or essential grasp of reality.

27 Ethics, po 1450

Bonhoeffer limits
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the mind to perceiving only the content, not the purpose or
of creationo

~orm,

Perception is universalized by reason yet without

reaching the formal determination, i.e., the divine orientation,
of the naturalo
drawn by

The inevitable conclusion to such a view is
in refusing to accept the rational as an au-

Bonhoef~er

thority on the natural or the possibility of a rational certitude
of its ethical norms.

"The natural can never be something that

is determined by any single part or any single authority within
the ~allen world.,,28
alone

The natural is adequately known by God

0

In spite of this analysis of the rational,
speak

o~

natural.

Bonhoe~~er

does

universal rights, duties and relationships which are
These universals are, in some way, ethically relevant,

since their denial or perversion is the unnatural element of the
world which distorts the will

o~

God.

However, the misrepresen-

tation of some element of the natural is discovered by the selfcorrective quality of natural life rather than rational analysis~

posteriori not

~

priori.

Unified by the necessity of the pen-

ultimate, these rights, duties and relationships are the form of
natural life.
Th~rights

of natural life are explicated in terms of the

principle flsuum cuique: to each his own$u 2 9

Respect for this

principle is penultimate since it is due regard for the gifts of
the Creator.

Suum cuique is that dictum of Roman Law which is

28Ibid ., p. 1470
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the highest possible achievement of reason.

This precept reaches

the real privileges bestowed on natural lire, without reaching
God who authorizes them.

Under this norm Bonhoeffer considers

the natural rights of bodily life, and intended to analyse the
natural rights of the lire of the mind, the natural right to work
and property, to fellowship, piety, happiness, mental and bodily
self-defense. 30

Two things should be noted at this point; first,

that Bonhoeffer gives concrete judgments on concrete issues such
as euthanasia, suicide, and murder; secondly, Bonhoeffer's analysis of the penultimate makes it the place of legitimate consideration of moral principles and norms o

This is a development of

Bonhoeffer's earliest statement on ethics at Barcelona when he
denied that any action could be called good or bad before its
execution and that any principle could have general validity.
The universal duties of natural life are implied by the
rights.

Man's recognition of the rights of his nature necessi-

tates the response to other men that can be categorized as responsibility or deputyship.

The rights of the individual are

also the rights of the entire natural order and thus prohibit
self-assertion and demand altruism.
accepta~e

Responsibility is the free

of the obligation imposed by the "other's" rights.

Itpertinence" is the obligation placed on one by the nature of
inanimate things0 31 Duties give prohibition and rights give
3 0Bonhoerfer's outline for these chapter headings is extant,
whereas he did not have time to complete these sections. Ethics,
p. 186, n. 220
31Ibid., ppo 235-360
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permission; they must remain together or ethics deteriorates to
"the Kantian ethic of dutY.o.or to the ethic of irresponsible
genius.,,3 2

The right to self-preservation is balanced by the

maxim that "all deliberate killing of innocent life is arbitrary.n33

The rights of marriage and reproduction necessarily

imply the duties of a familyo
Bonhoeffer's casuistry is the concrete application of his
conception of the will of God as realized in definite and visible
structures within human history.

This insight provided Bonhoef-

fer with dogmatic and corrective goals for his ethical system.
He attempted to reconcile the gospel and law, to account for the
rational and the situation within ethical decisions, and to
stimulate his fellow Christians to a more dynamic and social
awareness of moral responsibility.

Christology was the unifying

element of Bonhoeffer's ethic, while the distinction between the
ultimate and the penultimate was his working principle.

This

distinction was analysed and explicated in terms of the natural
and the mandates, that is, in terms which were intelligible to
"man come of ageo"

However, the fusion of diverse elements and

purposes within the ethical theory of Bonhoeffer, gives his
system &p eclectic character and poses the problem of internal
consistency.

32Ibid ., p. 251.

33~o, p. 1600

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION AND CRITIQUE
Bonhoeffer was a Christian writing an ethics for Christianso
This fact is the strength and weakness of his ethical formulao
He attempted to show the relevance of faith to a free and fruitful movement through life.

He hoped to present ethical attitudes

for the believer that would replace the ideologies that faltered
in the changing world.
everyday lifeo

He intended to integrate Christianity and

Bonhoeffer's life is evidence that such an ethic

is not only livable, but that it is worth dying for.

However,

the Christian ethic of Dietrich Bonhoeffer is Christian, i.eo,
supposes a Lutheran doctrine, and thus has a conditional and
restricted application.

Secondly, there is a lack of clarity in

Bonhoeffer's explication.

Bonhoeffer strains to include the

rational and natural in a framework adapted to only one ethical
criterion--the will of God.

Finally, this chapter will try to

establish that an irreconcilable tension exists between the dog-

..

matic foundations of Bonhoeffer's thought and the experiential
needs that he attempted to incorporate into his moral theology.
Bonhoeffer was a Lutheran theologian and his ethic is applicable to that audience which shares his theological starting
points

0

Dogmas such as the corruption of the mind and heart of
68
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man by the Fall, that man is justified by faith and not by works
and even that man

~

sin boldly but believe more boldly are the

presuppositions of Bonhoeffer's formulations.

Consequently, an

acceptance of these religious tenets is prior to the unqualified
reception of Bonhoeffer's ethical work.

Bonhoeffer tries to find

purely natural evidence for these dogmas by an analysis of the
radical immanence of philosophy and the fundamental indecisiveness of conscience.
his theology.

But Bonhoeffer's ethic is ever a facet of

Any unorthodox interest such as a non-biblical

terminology for the "world come of age" or natural ethical criteria is limited by the restrictions of his Lutheran premises.
Ethics as formation is possible only upon the foundation
of the form of Jesus Christ which is present in His
Church
The Church is the place where Jesus Christ's
taking form is proclaimed and accomplished. It is this
proclamation and t~iS event that Christian ethics is
designed to serve.,
0

This definition of ethics excludes all non-Christian moral
theory from the realm of the ethicalo

Ethical decision is that

situation of solitude before the will of God, when the individual
tries to exclude every criterion of judgment except the divine
judgment.,

The ethical situation is not the clash of values or

the conflict of moral principles or even the attempt to distin-

.

guish good and evil; rather it is activity commanded by God.
Ethics is not concerned with nought" or "should" but with the
reality of Christ's present form.

In effect, Bonhoeffer reserves

ethics, in the true meaning of the word, for the domain of the
IEthics, p. 88

0
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ultimate~

tification.

Man is rendered ethical in the realm of faith and jusThis notion of ethics is fully consistent with the

theological anthropology proposed by Bonhoeffer.

If one is not

fully man until the moment of faith, then neither are one's activities truly human until that time.

The unbeliever has no poten-

tial for moral behavior in Bonhoeffer's theory.
Ethics is not the attempt to determine the right and wrong
of behavior prior to its execution.
arbitrary.

Bonhoeffer rejects

~

This sense of ethics is

priori principles as a restric-

tion of the ethical to the limits of conscience, which is the
voice of man's essential disunification in the Fall.

Conscience,

principles, rational analysis, experience--all these are penultimate and belong to the realm of ethics only if they accept the
")

fact that "it is the ultimate which determines the penultimate. lI £:!
The real ethical judgment is that one executed by the believer
who commits his activity to the mercy of God.
When Bonhoeffer says that the ethical is a "peripheral
event" he means more than the sporadic experience of decision
between good and evilo

Man is not caught moment by moment in

conscious choice between heaven or hell.

However, Bonhoeffer

would fupther regulate ethical language such as "ought" or tlmustfl
to the divine commandments and the ethical situation to the
authority-obedience situation presented only in the ultimateo
The obligation of "shall II or "should" applies only to a
peripheral situation, and this obligation is inwardly
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disrupted, if from being a peripheral concept it is converted into a pedagogical method. "Shall tl or Itshould tl
is always an "ultimate" word •• oIf the ethical ceases to
be understood as an "ultimate" word, ••• its place is taken
by a trite and jejune moralizationoooWhat suffers the
decisive loss here is not merely the abundant fulness of
life but the very essence of the ethical itself.3
The importance of authorization for ethical consideration is
yet another reason for claiming that the "ethical" in
theory is a Christian dimension.

Bonhoeffer~

Not only what is said but who

says it is critical to ethics, since ethics is a relationship
established by commands of a superior.

In the end, "God's com-

mandment is the only warrant for ethical discourse.,,4

This

authorization for ethics is granted only to Christian ethics and
is considered only in terms of obedience or disobedience to the
divine mandates.
The origin of the whole problem of ethics is the Fall.
Revelational ethics has knowledge of this event.

Only

Christian

ethics alone knows the will of God as the sole determinant of the
good, and recognizes the domain of ethical concern by the command
of God.

Theological ethics therefore is more than the fulfill-

ment of philosophical ethics--it is their denial.

"The knowledge

of good and evil seems to be the aim of all ethical reflection.
The first task of the Christian ethics is to invalidate this
knowledge.,,5

Thus, Bonhoeffer's ethics condemns the non-believer

3Ibid ., pp. 266-680
4 Ibid ., p. 2770
5Ibid ., p. 170
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to the meaningless and frustrating dilemma of experiencing ethical problems without possessing the freedom or the knowledge to
achieve a moral solution.

Bonhoeffer, therefore, has no inten-

tion of formulating an ethic adequate to evaluate and guide
behavior for the non-Christian.

The clarity and consistency of

Bonhoeffer's ideas must, therefore, be considered regarding those
who share Bonhoeffer's Christian premise.
Bonhoefferts Lutheran principles, his conception of the
effects of Original Sin and the meaning of the Redemption in
Christ are strongly operative in his definition of the ethical. 6
However, Ethics and his Letters and Papers from Prison show a
development within Bonhoefferts thought which tried seriously to
account for the relative autonomy of the world, and the corresponding relative validity of purely "natural" ethicso

The ulti-

mate does not deny the penultimate; the Christian must respect
"human and general conditionsl! and the "relevant questions of
principle.,,7

Bonhoeffer advocates a system that includes facts

as well as faith.

But considering the demands of his theology

and his Christological premise, it is questionable whether Bonhoeffer can make the natural and the rational to be morally relevant

wi~hout

being inconsistent.

For instance, if creation was

completely perverted by the Fall, then nature does not express
6These theological premises are not open to criticism by
this paper except to request that they are not the only conclusions that have been drawn from revelationo
7Ethics, pe 248.
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the will of God nor does it contain ethical norms evident to
reason.
The metaphysic that underlies Bonhoeffer's ethics is not
articulated but it is seen by its effects to be a type of voluntarismo

The ontological status of finite being is established

only in God's volitional relation to it.

There is no continuity

of being between the Creator and the creature, only a void.

One

may not even speak of the relation of cause and effect in terms
that would condition the absolute freedom of God.

The freedom

of God is not even limited by the historical Word of God. 8

The

absolute distinction of God and the world is mediated by God's
will actualized in Christ.

Therefore the natural and the penul-

timate have an "analogy of relation" to the ground of all finitude, i.e., God.
The will of God through the Word of God can and does change
through history; thus ethics must be free from absolute principles and norms to correspond to the present divine command.

Yet,

while professing the absolute freedom of God, and His changing
will for man.

Bonhoeffer also holds that the concept of poten-

tiality cannot be applied to God.
cept of

~otentiality

ItThe introduction of the con-

into the Christian idea of God represents a

limiting of the divine omnipotence.,,9

It is difficult to see how

God can change and yet be total act without any potentiality.
8Act and Being, p. 81.
9No Rusty Swords, po 32.
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The will of God can change or there is a limitation to the divine
freedom, but the will of God must not change or there is an actualization of potency.

This metaphysical difficulty with Bonhoef-

fer's notion of God reoccurs on the level of his ethical theory
as a problem of how to give some content to morality.
One's ethical duty is derived from God's absolute power to
impose obligation.

This position is a type of positivism, i.e.,

obligation is posited by the will of God.

That the will of God

is the only ethical norm is consciously held in Bonhoeffer's earliest period. lO

Karl Barth noted the positivistic quality of

Bonhoeffer's moral theory.

In 1931, Barth criticized Bonhoeffer

for making Christ into an ethical principle and killing all other
criteria.

In Ethics, the concept of conformation shows Bonhoef-

fer's appreciation of the will of God as the sole determinant of
goodness.

Mants conformity with Christ is his only judgment of

good or evil.

Biblical positivism is indicative of the emphasis

that Bonhoeffer gives the absolute freedom and power of God in
his theology.

The lack of absolute norms and principles is fully

consistent with a voluntaristic notion of God.
However, Bonhoeffer attempts to give a meaningful place to
natural

~riteria

in ethics.

This addition of natural principles

which are valid in their own right is simply not consistent with
Bonhoeffer's voluntarism-positivism.

Bonhoeffer's addition of

lO"There are no actions which are bad in themselves." No
Rusty Swords, po 44. "There cannot be good and evil as general
ideas~ but only as qualities of will making decisions."
Ibido,
po 460
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content to ethics by the notions of the natural, penultimate and
the mandates constitutes a logical burden on his premises.

Con-

sidering Bonhoeffer's Natural Theology and his Christology, it i
difficult to attribute ethical significance to anything save the
will of God.

A series of quotations will serve to demonstrate

that in Bonhoeffer's ethic, priority is given to formalism rathe
than content.
a) Content

Bodily life, which we receive without any action
on our own part, carries within itself the right
to its own preservation. This is not a right that
we have justly or unjustly appropriated to ourselves, but it is in the strictest sense an "innate"
right, one which we have passively received and
which pre-exists our will, a right which rests upon
the nature of things as they areo (Ethics, p. 155.)

b) Form

And here we are confronted with the fact that
natural life does not possess its right in itself,
but only in God. (Ethics, p. 168.)

a) Content

From its origin there is inherent in every thing
its own law of being, no matter whether this thing
is a natural object or a product of the human mind,
and no matter whether it is a material or an ideal
entity. (Ethics, p. 236.)

b) Form

The origin, essence and goal of all reality is the
real, that is to say, God in Jesus Christ. (Ethics,
po 2350)

a) Content

It is necessary in the given situation to observe,
to weigh up, to assess and to decide, always within
the limitations of human knowledge in general. One
must risk looking into the immediate future; one
must devote earnest thought to the consequences of
one1s actions; and one must endeavor to examine
one's own motives and one's own hearto (Ethics,
p. 233.

.•

b) Form

But because it was God who became man, it follows
that responsible action, in the consciousness of
the human character of its deCiSion, can never
itself anticipate the judgment as to whether it
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is in conformity with its or~g~n, its essence and
its goals, but this judgment must be left entirely
to Gode (Ethics, p. 2340)
More sources could be cited but these are sufficient to show that
every attempt of Bonhoeffer to give some intrinsic ethical value
to the natural is futilee

Content or metaphysical status of

goodness and evil is not compatible with Bonhoeffer's positivism
or with his voluntarism.

Each effort to give ethical relevance

to the penultimate is cancelled by the uncaused, un-conditioned
freedom of the ultimatee

How can nature have any ethical weight

when it is neither a moral criterion nor per

~

good or bad?

Rational deliberation and judgment on moral behavior are only the
non-essential conditions of God's totally free acceptance or
rejection.

Consequently it is necessary to say that Bonhoeffer's

attempt to give the world an ethical value is ineffective.

The

natural rights of the body, for instance, are inconsistent with
the omni-present presupposition of justification by faith alone.
The specifications and directives that Bonhoeffer does draw
from the natural realm are based on the supposition that the
natural form of life is both an end and a means. ll

Rape, tor-

ture, etc., are "serious violations of the right which is given
with the, creation of man. ,,12

However, a human right which is an

end in itself is a denial of Bonhoeffer's own definition of the
"natural" and the fact of Original Sin.

The natural is that

which serves the plan of God: it is a means.
llEthics, p. 1500

That any aspect of

-
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the natural is an end in itself makes that aspect greater than
the sum which is only preserved as a means to attain justification and redemption by God.

The fact that any right "given with

the creation" still exists within the fallen world denies the
anthropology on which Bonhoeffer built his ethics.

Content is a

systematic difficulty regarding Bonhoeffer's theological
points.

startin~

Moreover, this exposition of the natural as an end in

itself and founded upon creational rights is an inconsistency
even within Bonhoeffer's ultimate-penultimate distinction.
Both in Bonhoeffer's definition of ethics and in his style
of positivism there is a trace of provincialism o

The truly ethi-

cal dimension is closed to the non-Christian and moreover, to

an~

brand of Christianity that holds an analogy of being or an ontological relationship to Godo

Criticism of other ethical systems,

theological and philosophical, is often accomplished with an
unhealthy amount of generalization and stylization which is simply unfair to the complexity and detail of the individual's
thought 013

Moreover, Bonhoeffer does not present his ethics

with the purpose of convincing his readers of the truth value of
his viewpoint.
share

h~

Bonhoeffer explicates an ethic for those who

beliefso

Even Christians who share Bonhoeffer's con-

cern for the determination of the will of God in their lives will
find limited merit in the principle of conformation or the explanation of the gospel commandments as self-evident in their
13The reduction of philosophers into "pure" positions is admitted by Bonhoeffer! Act and Being, p. 19 and EthiCS, po 170
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concrete proclamation.
If the book [Ethics] is regarded as a working out of certain theological presuppositions, it has considerable
merit, although evaluation of its consistency would still
be a difficultyG But if it is regarded as a sustained
argument for a certain viewpoint in ethics, it is disappointing. 14
Bonhoeffer benefitted from the failures of past ethical systems.

He saw the immaturity fostered by reliance on principles.

He interpreted a law as an appeal to action rather than a prohibition.

Bonhoeffer experienced the peripheral quality of ethical

dilemma and onets psychological uncertainty concerning personal
motiveso

Bonhoeffer envisioned the social dimension of ethics

and noted the absence of any absolute ethical authority among
men.

The ethical importance of the situation or context was evi-

dent to Bonhoeffero

His Christian ethics was proposed as an

alternative to the inaction and indecision fostered by weak ethical systems or ideologies.
However, the Christian ethic of Bonhoeffer has no educative
quality.

It is a questionable guide for man's effort to deter-

mine beforehand the right or wrong of an intended course of action.

In the final analysis, the real moral judgment is made

only by Godo

.•

Bonhoefferts ethics is labored by the juxtaposition

of positivism and natural laws.

There is a further lack of clar-

ity in the relationship of ends and means which Bonhoeffer discusses regarding the penultimate-ultimate distinctiono

Even when

14Rollo Handy, lIAn Analytic and a Dogmatic Ethics," The
Review of Metaphysics, X, 4 (June, 1957), po 6960
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his Christian premise is accepted, no meaningful method of determining the will and commandment of God is given by Bonhoeffer.
In short, Dietrich Bonhoeffer's moral theology is more valuable
for its criticism of other ethical systems, than for its positive
achievement 0

..

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Works of Bonhoeffer
Act and Being. Trans. by Bernard Noble, with an Introduction by
--- ~nst Wolf. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962.
Christ the Center. Ed. by Eberhard Bethge. Trans. by John Bowde~with an Introduction by Edwin H. Robertsono
New York:
Harper and Row, 19600
The Communion of Saints. Trans. by Ronald Gregor Smith and
--- others. New York: Harper and Row, 1963.
"Concerning the Christian Idea of God,tt The Journal of Religion,
XII, No.2 (April, 1963), pp. 177-1S?:
-The Cost of Discipleship. Trans. by Reginald H. Fuller, with
~orr by Go Leibholzo
New York: The Macmillan Co., Paperback Edition, 1963.
Creation and Fall--Temptation. Ed. by Eberhard Bethge. Trans.
by John C. Fletcher and Kathleen Downham. New York: The
Macmillan Co., Paperback Edition, 19590
Ethics. Edo by Eberhard Bethge. Trans. by Neville Horton Smith.
New York: The Macmillan Coo, Paperback Edition, 1955.
Gesammelte Schriften, I-IV. Ed. by Eberhard Bethge.
Kaiser Verlag, 1958-1961.

chi.

Munich:

I Loved This People. Trans. by Keith R. Crim, with an Introduction-bY Hans Rothfels. Richmond, Vao: John Knox Press, 19650
Letters -and Papers from Prison. Ed. by Eberhard Bethgeo Trans 0
by Reginald H.-puJler. New York: The Macmillan Co., Paperback Edition, 1962.
Life Together. Trans., with an Introduction by John W. Doberstein. New York: Harper and Brothers, 19540
No Rusty Swords--Letters, Lectures and Notes, 1928-1936, Vol. 10
Edo, with an Introduction by Edwin Ho Robertson. Trans. by

--

80

81

Edwin Ho Robertson and John Bowden.
Row, 1965.

New York: Harper and

The Way to Freedom--Letters, Lectures and Notes, 1935-1939, Vol.
IIe Ed., with an Introduction by Edwin H. Robertson. Trans
by Edwin H. Robertson and John Bowden. New York: Harper and
Row, 1966.
Extended Works about Bonhoeffer
Bethge, Eberhard. liThe Challenge of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Life
and Theolo~y," The Chicago Theological Seminary Register,
LI, No.2 (February, 1961), pp. 1-38.
Godsey, John D. Preface to Bonhoeffer. Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1965. (Contains two essays that were previously
untranslated.)
____~~. The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffere
Westminster Press, 1960.
Marty, Martin E. (ed.).
Association Press,
Metha, Vedo

The Place of Bonhoeffer.
--

l~o

The New Theologian.

Philadelphia:
New York:

New York: Harper and Row, 1965.

Moltmann, Jurgen and Weissbach, Jurgeno Two Studies in the Theology of Bonhoeffer. Trans. by Reginald H. and Ilse Fuller
with an-Introduction by Reginald H. Fullero New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 19670
Robertson, Edwin H. Dietrich Bonhoeffer.
Knox Press, 1966.

Richmond, Va.: John

Sherman, Franklin Eugene. liThe Problem of a 'Trinitarian' Social
Ethic--A Study in the Theological Foundations of Christian
Social Ethics with Special Reference to Werner Elert and
Dietrich Bonhoeffer. 1f Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Degartment of Theology, University of Chicago, 19610
Zimmermann, Wolf-Dieter and Smith, Ronald Gregor (edso).
Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Trans. by Kathe Gregor Smith.
York: Harper and Row, 1966.

I Knew
NeW---

82
Shorter Works about Bonhoeffer
Bartley III, W. W. "The Bonhoeffer Revival," The New York Review
of Books, V, No.2 (August 26, 1965), ppo-r4-I?: ---Bethge, Eberhard. "Dietrich Bonhoeffer," World Dominion, XXXV,
No.2 (April, 1957), pp. 77-81.
_ _--...::~. "Dietrich Bonhoeffer: An Account of His Life," The
Plough, III, No.2 (1955), pp. 35-42.
__--=~. liThe Editing and Publishing of the Bonhoeffer Papers,tl
The Andover Newton Bulletin, LII, No.2 (December, 1959),

pp.

1-24~

Ebeling, Gerhard.
1963.

Word and Faith.

Philadelphia: Fortress Press,

Elson, John T. "A Man for Others," Life, Volo 58 (May, 1965),
ppo 108-116.
Handy, Rollo. "An Analytic and a Dogmatic Ethics," The Review
MetaphYSiCS, X, No o 4 (June, 1957), pp. 690-697:--

.2.!

Lehmann, Paul L. "Commentary: Dietrich Bonhoeffer in America,"
Religion in Life, XXX, No.4 (Autumn, 1961), pp. 616-6180
Macquarrie, Johno Twentieth Century Religious Thought.
York: Harper and Row, 19630

New

Marty, Martin E. and Peerman, Dean G. (edso)o A Handbook of
Christian Theologians. Cleveland: World PUblishing Company,
19650
Porteous, Alvin C. Prophetic Voices in Contemporary Theology.
Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1966.--

..

APPROVAL SHEE T

The thesis submitted by David W. Clark has been read
and approved by the director of the thesis. Furthermore, the
final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis
and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that
any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the
thesis is now given final approval with reference to content and
form.
The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

~)'1i
14(,,'6
Date

